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The Strategic Responses of the Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises 





Every market has a set of institutions that govern the ways that societal 
interactions take place, including business transactions. Multinational enterprises are 
global entities that have operations in many different countries in the world and have to 
adapt their processes and strategies to local institutions, which are often very different 
from those in their home countries, particularly in emerging and developing economies.  
This research employs the concept of institutional work to investigate the strategic 
responses of the subsidiaries of multinational enterprises operating in Morocco to local 
institutional pressures during stable periods as well as periods characterized by 
institutional upheaval, as was the case following the Arab Spring events in the Middle 
East. The study found that the subsidiaries of multinational enterprises are able to respond 
strategically and proactively in their host environments, through their everyday actions 
such as interactions with local actors or though highly visible actions such as the 
introduction of a new norm, standard or practice. Furthermore, the research suggests that 
during institutional change, the subsidiaries of multinational enterprises have a greater 
opportunity to act strategically and to capitalize on the transitions occurring to bring about 
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The Strategic Responses of the Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises During 
Institutional Upheaval 
The international business environment has significantly changed during the latter part of 
the 20
th
 Century as many developing countries began their economic liberalization. A notable 
example is China, which introduced economic reforms in the late 1970s, opening up the country 
to foreign investment. Another example is the case of Central and Eastern European countries 
that introduced major institutional and economic reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s. Economic liberalization continued into the new century as more countries opened up 
their markets to the world’s multinational enterprises (Ul-Haq and Farashahi, 2010). In 2013, 
developing economies received $778 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, while 
transition and developed countries received $108 and $556 billion, respectively (UNCTAD, 
2014). As these trends indicate, emerging markets make up the world’s fastest growing markets 
for most products and services and multinational enterprises (MNEs) are increasingly seeking 
growth opportunities and entering new and profitable business sectors within these markets. 
However, while seeking new opportunities in these markets, MNEs may face a local institutional 
context that is very different from the one in their home market and consequently may struggle in 
adapting to some of the specificities of the host market (Tarnovskaya, 2012). For instance, the 
political, social, and economic systems such as product, labor and capital markets in developing 
or emerging countries can be very different from the ones in developed countries. In addition, 
many developing and emerging economies are characterized by underdeveloped local 
institutions, which can result in greater government interference in business, lack of reliable 
consumer information and weak trade unions, hence impacting business strategies (Tarnovskaya, 
2012). Thus, although emerging markets are key investment locations for MNEs, in order to be 
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successful in these markets MNEs must understand the specificities of the institutional 
environments as well as strategically manage the challenges that exist within these markets.  
Emerging economies have attracted a large amount of research from international 
management scholars. Many studies have looked at multinational entry mode and performance as 
a function of institutional distances, which are the differences in the regulatory, normative, and 
cognitive institutions between the home and host countries. In addition, several studies have 
looked at the ways that government institutions and FDI decisions impact the characteristics and 
survival of foreign subsidiaries (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Henisz and Delios, 2001, 2004; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000). However, there is a dearth of research on the strategies of MNE 
subsidiaries operating in developing and emerging markets; this is an important area of research 
because subsidiaries can have an important impact on host country institutions through their 
strategies and practices. Subsidiaries have to manage various elements in their institutional 
environment, including political and legal elements in addition to the more traditional product 
and market-focused variables (Baron 1995) and while doing so can influence local institutions.  
Many scholars have used institutional theory to explore issues of international 
management as it addresses the relationship between organizations and their environment. 
Developing and emerging markets provide a good setting to examine the impact of institutions on 
MNE activities and behavior because they are characterized by weaker institutional environments 
and tend to experience important institutional transitions that can lead to volatile environments 
that MNEs must manage (Peng, 2003). At the same time, when global companies establish 
operations in developing and emerging markets, they bring with them expertise, knowledge, 




An enduring debate in institutional organizational studies has centered on whether 
organizational structures and strategies are shaped by institutional environments or whether 
organizations have the ability to make strategic decisions and to influence institutions and other 
organizations (Beckert, 1999). Early research on institutional theory posited that institutions had 
a significant impact on organizational structure and practice, and imparted agency with a limited 
role. In contrast, more recent research has focused on institutional entrepreneurship, which 
portrays actors as powerful agents that can significantly shape institutions (Lawrence et al., 
2009). 
Drawing from the more recent approaches to institutional theory, I explore the actions and 
roles of MNE subsidiaries and the strategies that these organizations use to effect change and to 
influence their business environment to gain more favorable outcomes. This research will employ 
the concept of institutional work, which suggests that companies or collectivities of them can 
create, maintain or destroy institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). This paper argues that 
MNE subsidiaries are constrained by regulations and norms within their institutional environment 
but at the same time strive to shape them using institutional work. Organizational strategies may 
vary from conforming to active resistance in response to institutional pressures, depending on the 
kinds of pressures exerted on organizations (Oliver, 1991). The scale and scope of MNE 
subsidiaries dictate that they are continually engaging in actions, which allow them to not only 
operate in their institutional environments but also to shape them. For example, one of the ways 
that MNEs attempt to minimize costs associated with weak regulatory frameworks, characteristic 
of many developing and emerging markets, is by establishing relationships with local actors to 
help them influence local institutions (Khanna et al., 2005). In many developing and emerging 
countries routine permits can be difficult to obtain and MNE subsidiaries develop relationships 
with key actors to facilitate the process of obtaining these permits.  These markets can also be 
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susceptible to political and social disturbances, which can lead to important changes in local 
institutions, impacting MNEs’ business environments; MNEs build government and political 
connections and social ties to mitigate some of the risks associated with political instability and 
market volatility (Khanna, Palepu and Sinha, 2005). Thus, this paper seeks to explore the 
following questions: How do MNE subsidiaries respond to local institutions in developing 
countries? What strategies do they employ in a volatile institutional environment or one 
characterized by institutional change? 
I address these questions by exploring how the subunits of 10 different MNEs from the 
United States, France, the Netherlands, and Germany respond to local institutions and constraints 
within the Moroccan institutional environment. In addition, I examine the strategies of MNE 
subsidiaries during the institutional change that took place following the protests and institutional 
upheaval known as the ‘Arab Spring’ that occurred in many Middle Eastern countries. The 
research provides insight on how decision makers interpreted and reacted to the institutional 
pressures that were caused by the social movement. It investigates the strategies employed by 
MNE subsidiaries in Morocco to retain or gain legitimacy in their environment, notably during 
periods of institutional change. Economic or socio-political changes in a country entail important 
changes in economic, social, and legal institutions, which can cause challenges and increase costs 
for MNE subsidiaries. Thus, the current research will investigate the strategies used by MNE 
subsidiaries to adapt to the institutional changes that took place.  
On the whole, there is a dearth of empirical and conceptual research that examines the 
proactive roles of firms and their relationships with local actors in emerging markets, particularly 
during times of institutional change. The present study will focus on Morocco and will examine 
the relationships that international MNE subsidiaries build with local actors. As suggested by 
some studies, changes in the institutional environment of firms can present opportunities to 
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transform industry standards or bring about other changes that are favorable to them (Karam and 
Jamali, 2013). Using institutional work as a basis, the study will examine the ways in which the 
relationships of MNE subsidiaries with government actors and social constituents evolved during 
the Arab Spring and the ways in which MNE subsidiaries engaged in institutional work to 




The multinational enterprise (MNE) today plays a key role in the global economy as over 
one third of international trade consists of transfers among MNE units (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). 
The transnational corporation has been of special interest to organizational theorists because it is 
a large single organization that operates in a global environment and needs to coordinate the 
activities of its different subsidiaries. Each MNE subsidiary faces a specific local environment in 
addition to the context of the whole organization, which it relies on for resources and 
administrative practices (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). Within the local environment, MNE 
subsidiaries operate within a specific institutional framework, which is defined as a “set of 
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that establish the basis for economic 
activities” (Davis and North, 1971:6). The subsidiaries of MNEs can only gain legitimacy from 
different sources in their local environment if they adopt certain practices. Firms want to be 
legitimate so that they can gain access to resources and have greater support from their external 
environment (Gelbuda et al. 2007).  
MNE subsidiaries originating from developed countries and operating in emerging 
markets face specific challenges because the business and cultural environments of those markets 
can be very different from those of their home markets. An important difference between 
developed and emerging markets is that the influence of socio-political institutions in emerging 
markets is very high (Sheth, 2011). For example, governments, business groups, religion and 
local communities have an important influence on business strategies (Hoskinsson et al., 2000). 
MNE subsidiaries newly entering a market may feel uncertain because the local government can 
change laws and regulations quickly and without warning (Xie and Boggs, 2006; Tarnovskaya, 
2012). Moreover, although many emerging countries have experienced extensive development as 
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a result of liberalization and represent attractive investment opportunities for MNE subsidiaries, 
these markets can also be accompanied with social and political disturbances (Ghauri et al. 2012). 
An important question is then: given that the management of business in emerging markets is an 
important strategic issue for MNEs’ growth, how do they adapt to uncertain local environments? 
MNE subsidiaries’ behavior in these emerging markets cannot be analyzed without consideration 
of the social and political context.  For instance, social ties and political connections emerge as 
strategic options that may enable MNE subsidiaries to manage environmental uncertainties 
(Sheth, 2011). According to Ghauri et al. (2012), when formal institutions do not lead to effective 
functioning, informal governance (like co-operation between MNE subsidiaries and social 
organizations) is important for the management of political uncertainty.  
The following section on the neo-institutional theory literature will discuss some of the 
main conceptual frameworks for understanding the pressures that MNE subsidiaries face in their 
institutional environments, and the strategic responses that they can use to alleviate some of these 
pressures.  
Institutions and Markets 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory has been widely used for the study of organizations within their 
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). It explores 
the ways in which social structures such as schemas, rules, norms, and routines become models 
that guide social behavior and the ways in which practices or ideas are created, spread or changed 
over space and time (Scott, 2005). Scholars of institutional theory have recognized that 
institutional forces can greatly shape and influence organizations. According to Meyer (1970), 
the existing social order is the result of social norms and rules that dictate the ways that actors 
can take action; in fact, the actions of the latter are socially constructed.  Organizational models 
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were also theorized to be based on rationalized myths or “rule-like systems” that depend for their 
existence and efficacy on the fact they are widely shared or have been spread by influential 
groups or individuals (Scott, 1983). These models of rationality provide templates for the 
policies, programs and procedures that formal organizations should employ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). When an organization adopts one of these models it gains social legitimacy from its 
stakeholders and other audiences that are external to the organization (Scott, 2005).  
If organizational models and forms are socially constructed, it stands to reason that there 
are formal structures and norms in the environment of organizations that enable and constrain 
their behaviors (Suddaby et al., 2005). Scott developed a framework that is crucial to 
understanding the role of institutions and their influence on organizations. According to him, 
institutions are composed of “cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that, together 
with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (1995:33). 
Regulative elements include rules, procedures, regulatory guidelines or sanctions. These elements 
are enforced by entities that have power, such as the state or another regulatory body. The 
normative pillar emphasizes the role of values and norms in creating social obligations; for 
example, the creation of roles and professionalization are the result of normative institutions in 
society. Finally, cultural-cognitive elements are shared conceptions through which meaning is 
socially created through communication. The cultural-cognitive pillar emphasizes the existence 
of different types of scripts and belief systems that are employed on a cultural level and that lead 
to legitimating institutionalized social practices. These beliefs about the world or the ways that a 
particular social action should take place become taken-for-granted within a society (Scott, 
2001). See Table 1 for a summary of Scott’s pillars. Interactions and material elements within 
social structures are both created and constrained by cultural, normative and regulative factors, 
which they, in turn produce and reproduce (Giddens, 1979; Sewell 1992). Institutions dictate the 
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rules of the game, both formal (e.g. regulations and laws) and informal (e.g. codes of conduct and 
norms) and provide structure and meaning to the economic, political, and social relationships in a 
society (North, 1990; Scott 1995). 
Table 1: Type of Institutions  
 
Source: Scott, 2008  
Organizations must manage institutional pressures that are exerted from regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements in their institutional contexts to gain or maintain 
legitimacy within these environments. Institutional pressures can come from government 
agencies, interest groups, public opinion, and social, business and professional networks (Oliver, 
1996). Organizations conform to the institutional pressures within their environment in order to 
gain legitimacy. In fact, institutional arrangements provide legitimacy, which is a “generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 
Pillars of Institutions 
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574). Obtaining legitimacy involves different elements (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For 
example, one aspect is coercive; it is composed of regulatory institutions and is obtained through 
rules and laws. A second aspect is the normative one; a company has to demonstrate that its 
social values fit with that of the society in which it operates. A third aspect is cultural-cognitive; 
companies have to conform to norms that exist in their organizational field or society. Therefore, 
some actions within a particular institutional field come to be perceived as legitimate (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) and may become the best way to do things, making it difficult for actors to deviate 
from those particular types of actions (Scott, 2008).  
According to institutional theory, there is a strong isomorphic pull from the firm’s 
institutional environment which leads the firm to experience strong pressure to behave as 
indicated by the society and to conform to laws, rules, values and norms, even if this isn’t 
efficient for the firm. Institutions can influence organizations through coercive or normative 
pressures from institutional agents, such as the state and professional bodies, or through mimetic 
influences coming from similar organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), normative isomorphism is a process during which organizations 
become more similar to one another through professionalization. For example, individuals within 
a same profession or professional association begin to adopt institutionalized conventions and 
patterns of behavior (Edelman et al. 1991; 1992). Institutional arrangements are key to 
understanding how organizations function and the ways that practices and structures tend to be 
reproduced and taken for granted. As a result, organizational scholars have focused on the critical 
role that institutions play in providing continuity and stability in organizational processes (Garud 
et al. 2007).   
Institutions and MNEs    
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Traditional institutional theories that focus solely on the ways that institutions shape 
organizational behavior and encourage continuity and conformity through isomorphism lack 
explanatory power when they are applied to different forms of organizations (i.e. multinational 
enterprises) and do not account for instances of change in firms’ institutional environments 
(Kostova et al., 2008). Multinational enterprises consist of different subsidiaries operating in 
different institutional contexts. Every subsidiary has two distinct environments, one made up of 
the institutions in the host country and one consisting of the rest of the multinational, including 
the headquarters and other subsidiaries. The multinational faces pressure to conform to the 
values, norms and practices that are local to the host country, and to respect consistency with the 
rest of the multinational. Furthermore, many MNE subsidiaries, particularly those in developing 
or emerging countries, operate in complex and ambiguous environments. Thus, it is difficult for 
MNE subsidiaries to achieve and maintain legitimacy in the different markets within which they 
operate because of the multiplicity of legitimating environments, the complexity and diversity 
within their subunits, and the ambiguity in the process of obtaining legitimacy (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999).  
MNE subsidiaries attempt to attain legitimacy in the institutional environment by 
respecting regulatory institutions such as government issued regulations (coercive aspect), by 
following social values (normative aspect) and by adapting their behavior to conform to norms 
that are taken-for-granted in society (cultural-cognitive aspect). However, it can be challenging 
for the subsidiaries to achieve legitimacy through isomorphism, and difficult to conform to the 
various regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutional expectations coming from multiple and 
conflicting sources. MNE subsidiaries must thus find alternative legitimating mechanisms such as 
negotiating their status with different legitimating actors. Negotiation refers to a political process 
of interaction, communication, and exchange. MNE subsidiaries’ relationships with their 
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institutional environments are dynamic, flexible, and proactive (Kostova et al. 2008). Therefore, 
traditional institutional theories do not account enough for the role of strategic agency in 
organizations (Beckert, 1999). “In contrast to the deterministic neoinstitutional view, MNE 
subsidiaries have an important agency role reflected not only in their varying degree of 
compliance to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) but also in that they must make sense of, 
manipulate, negotiate, and partially construct their institutional environments” (Kostova et al., 
2008:1001). In fact, institutional theory must include in its framework the role of agents who 
have specific interests and objectives, particularly when dealing with instances of institutional 
change (Beckert, 1999).  
Recent Developments in Institutional Theory 
The institutional literature has tended to focus on the ways that institutions shape 
organizational behavior, explaining the stability and persistence of institutions rather than their 
evolution (Garud et al., 2007).  In recent years, however, management scholars have shown an 
interest in moving beyond the emphasis of institutional stability and isomorphism to focus instead 
on processes of change and the role of agentic behavior in propelling change (Oliver 1992; Seo 
and Creed, 2002). In the last two decades, attention has shifted from institutional behaviors and 
practices, and from the relations between actors, to a better understanding of how the actors 
themselves can influence institutions and are affected by institutions. Thus a more dynamic 
perspective is adopted and involves the evolution of the actors involved, such as MNEs (Verbeke 
et al., 2012). It has been argued that not only do actors have agency when faced with institutional 
influences but that they are also capable of responding in a variety of ways. Linking resource-
dependence arguments with institutional models, Oliver’s research suggests that organizations 
and their leaders do not simply respond to institutional demands with passive compliance but 
employ a range of strategic responses such as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance 
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and manipulation (1991). Other research has studied the ways in which organizations defend their 
legitimacy when the market they operate is either in a state of emergence, or disrupted by the 
introduction of radical innovations, new organizational forms or a new social order, and the ways 
that organizations create and legitimate and/or de-legitimate new fields, practices, or institutional 
fields (Turcan et al., 2012).  
 A great deal of the recent institutional literature has focused on the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship, which portrays actors as powerful agents that can influence institutions in 
important ways. These actors are able to influence the creation of institutions that they consider 
to be appropriate and aligned with their interests as a result of their resources and power 
(DiMaggio, 1988). This notion helps explain why new practices or new organizational forms 
come into existence and become well established. However, it faces the limitations associated 
with the structure-agency debate – does the environment have a greater influence on 
organizations or do organizations have a greater influence on institutions? Arguing that structure 
is more important than agency reifies some features of the social world and voids humans of 
agency and creativity and does not explain how institutions evolve. On the other hand, theories 
that privilege agency depict actors as heroic actors that intentionally sought to bring about 
changes in institutions. However, in many cases, institutions evolve and are reproduced as a 
result of unintended consequences from actors (Sewell, 1992).   
Institutional Change  
Recent research in institutional theory has shown that institutions can change over time 
and that they are not always uniformly taken-for-granted. In fact, institutions can be challenged 
and contested by powerful actors that can shape which actions are taken (DiMaggio, 1988). Thus, 
there has been a growing interest among scholars on how institutions are created, transformed or 
destroyed and the underlying processes that contribute to institutional change. Oliver (1992) 
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argues that there are several conditions that may lead to the de-institutionalization of practices or 
norms. For example, de-institutionalization can result when organizations become aware of 
performance issues or that the existing institutionalized practices are no longer beneficial to their 
organizations. For instance, Kratz and Moore (2002) show that as a result of changing student 
degree preferences and resource competition from other higher degree institutions, many liberal 
arts colleges began offering professional programs in business and public affairs. Institutionalized 
norms and practices may also evolve and be transformed when there is a redistribution of power 
and actors who had previously supported or legitimated an institution become irrelevant. Social 
pressures, such as an increase in workforce diversity and changes in laws or social expectations 
(i.e. implementation of affirmative action) can also lead to institutional change (Oliver, 1992).  
Seo and Creed’s (2002) research on institutional contradictions change and praxis argues 
that political actions are embedded in a system of connected but not always compatible 
institutional arrangements and the likelihood of action increases as contradictions in social 
systems develop and pervade actors’ social experiences. According to Schneiberg and Clemens 
(2006), institutional interactions are more visible during times of upheaval and change, where 
prevailing behaviors and norms are challenged.  
Rapid institutional reforms and institutional changes are one of the main sources of 
uncertainty for companies in emerging and developing economies and play an important role in 
MNE subsidiaries behaviors in these contexts (Chung and Beamish, 2005). According to Whitley 
(2003), MNE subsidiaries are more likely to pursue idiosyncratic ways of organizing within host 
and home environments when faced with institutionally weak international environments.  For 
example, in order to mitigate some of the risks associated with uncertain and volatile markets, 
MNE subsidiaries may build relationships with local actors. For firms entering and operating in 
emerging markets, it is important to develop relationships, not only with local business partners 
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but also with national and local governments. In fact, foreign multinational operations depend on 
educational, technological, and industrial infrastructures built by host governments (Alimadadi et 
al., 2012). Alimadadi et al.’s 2012 research on two MNE subsidiaries – Sandvik, a global 
engineering firm and Ericsson, a global provider of communications and technology services – 
illustrates the importance of political and social relationships in emerging markets. The study 
looked at Sandvik’s operations in China where after obtaining a business license from authorities 
in Beijing, the company also had to forge relations with the local authority and politicians where 
its plant was based so that it could discuss access to the labor force, taxes, gas, and the supply of 
energy. Because regulations and laws can change very quickly in China, the subsidiary’s 
relationship with the authorities is critical for its functioning. Alimadadi et al.’s research also 
documented the case of Ericsson’s operations in South Africa where the company had to comply 
with the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE), a law that was introduced to 
allow for wealth to be distributed across society after the fall of Apartheid in 1994. Within South 
African society, Ericsson was expected to be a good corporate citizen and subsequently invested 
in various projects with a social content. This study illustrates the influence of local institutions 
on MNE subsidiaries and the importance of building ties with local actors.  
Although relationships with government and political actors are essential, the value of 
political networks can change over time, and the embedded relationships with political 
institutions that were valuable at one point in time can become an impediment at a later stage, 
particularly if the actors with which the MNE subsidiary interacts lose legitimacy. At the same 
time, however, periods of institutional change can provide MNE subsidiaries with an opportunity 
to negotiate with government agencies and with other actors the implementation of practices that 
are favorable to their business environment. Thus, institutional theory must provide a central 
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place in its framework for the interest driven behavior of agents, especially when dealing with 
issues of organizational change (Beckert, 1999).  
Institutional Work 
The concept of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) complements the 
research on organizations and institutional change and has become an important area of research 
in the new institutional theory as it provides insights pertaining to the structure-agency debate 
(Gawer and Phillips, 2013). Institutional work refers to the purposeful actions and practices of 
individual and collective actors, which are aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutions (Lawrence et al., 2005). Institutional work is intentional – some of it is highly visible, 
but most types are mundane such as in the day-to-day adjustments, adaptations and compromises 
of actors that are trying to maintain institutions (Lawrence et al., 2005). Actors employ 
institutional work to manipulate their institutional environment. Examples of institutional work 
include lobbying for resources, promoting agendas, and proposing or destroying existing 
legislation (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2005). Institutional work concentrates on the effort of 
individuals and collective actors to adjust to, change, or re-create the institutional structures in 
which they exist, and which give them their roles, relationships, resources, and routines 
(Lawrence et al., 2010). It prompts researchers to ask: how do actors influence institutions and 
enact changes in these institutions when these very same institutions condition their intentions? 
Institutional work considers that there is a recursive relationship between institutions and agency 
but its focus is on how action affects institutions. It allows for a deeper investigation of the 
relationship between actors and their environment and the ways that strategic action and 
institutions affect each other.  
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Lawrence et al. (2011), identify several different types of work that are aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions. Creating institutions includes actions such as vesting, 
defining, advocacy, constructing identities and changing norms, constructing normative 
networks, mimicry, theorizing and educating. Vesting, defining and advocacy are political types 
of institutional work used by actors to reconstruct the rules, property rights and boundaries that 
help them gain access to material resources. Constructing identities, changing norms and 
constructing networks are actions taken to reconfigure actors’ belief systems. Mimicry, theorizing 
and educating involve actions designed to change the categories on which meaning systems 
depend on for their existence. This typology provides a useful framework for examining the 
relationship between purposeful action and institutions. 
Building on these initial theoretical insights, several empirical studies have been carried 
out to examine the ways that firms or actors with complex motivations and interests use specific 
strategies to create, maintain or disrupt institutions. Sarasini’s 2013 research looks at the factors 
that influence corporate political actions linked to climate policy in the Swedish electricity 
industry. The study treats corporate political action as a form of institutional work and finds that 
when certain climate policy instruments financially threaten these companies, they are more 
likely to use corporate political actions that aim to disrupt these regulative institutions. Currie et 
al.’s 2012 research focuses on how the creation of new nursing and medical roles in the English 
National Health System threatened the power and status of specialist doctors. These doctors 
engaged in institutional work to maintain institutional arrangements. For instance, they invoked 
the risks associated with transferring some of their responsibilities to other medical staff with less 
formal education and experience.  
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These studies point to the relevance and usefulness of the concept of institutional work in 
explaining complex processes of institutional change. The increasing scholarly interest in 
institutional work is showing that agents can act purposefully and can engage in and change their 
institutional context in different ways and with different intentions. This literature therefore 
provides a useful framework for studying different forms of institutional change, and particularly 
in understanding the role of actors in these processes. The current research uses the case of 
multinational corporations operating in a developing country, which is undergoing institutional 
change and argues that the institutional context presents a fertile ground for multinational 
companies who are striving to adapt to their environment, to engage in institutional work.  
Corporate Social Responsibility  
If organizations, including multinational enterprises, are composed of agents that can act 
purposefully and engage in institutional work to advance their interests, it stands to reason that 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices can also be used strategically to attain 
organizational goals. In fact, research on companies’ social responsibility has been moving away 
from a focus on legal compliance and maximizing profits (Greenfield, 2004) to looking at 
organizations as agents of change that are concerned about different issues and stakeholders in 
their institutional environments (Bies, Bartunek, Fort & Zald, 2007; Pettit, 2005). This research is 
consistent with our earlier discussion about actors engaging in institutional work to purposefully 
influence institutions; CSR strategies (ranging from mundane to highly visible) can be employed 
strategically to influence institutions. In the next sections, I will briefly review the literature on 
CSR to identify some important insights that will help focus the discussion on strategic forms of 
CSR.   
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) does not have a single, agreed-up definition and is 
often associated with sustainability, stakeholders, ethics (Carroll, 1979) and legal aspects. CSR 
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incorporates several different elements including protection of the environment (air, water, 
natural habitats), respect for employees and human rights, and selling safe goods and services to 
consumers (Harrison and Freeman, 1999). Many scholars define corporate social responsibility as 
actions adopted by an organization to contribute to society beyond the immediate economic, 
technical, and legal interests of the firm (e.g., Davis, 1973; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). For the 
purposes of this paper, CSR will refer to the firm’s propensity to consider stakeholder concerns in 
its business activities and decisions, and its inclusion of not only the primary stakeholders such as 
employees, customers and suppliers but also the larger community.  
According to the stakeholder approach, a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984:46). 
Stakeholders include any individuals or groups with which the corporation interacts with such as 
employees, consumers, and local communities (Campbell, 2007). Stakeholder theory argues that 
firms must take into consideration its primary stakeholders (shareholders, investors, employees, 
customs, suppliers) when making decisions as their survival depends on the continuing 
participation of these stakeholders. Firms are also dependent on public stakeholders such as 
governments and communities to provide infrastructures and legal frameworks that allow them to 
operate within an institutional context (Preble, 2005). Finally, firms must take into consideration 
stakeholders that do not directly influence their operations, such as the media and special interest 
groups because these stakeholders can influence how the public perceives them. Ignoring the 
demands of these stakeholders could potentially lead to challenges for the firm in the form of 
protests, boycotts, or legal issues that may have a negative impact on its profitability (Preble, 
2005).  
The numerous stakeholders in a firm’s institutional context can provide or take away 
legitimacy and determine the continuing success of the firm. If customers stop buying products, 
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shareholders sell their stock, employees stop working as hard, the government cancels subsidies 
or imposes penalties, and environmental activists protest, the firm loses legitimacy and its 
survival is at stake (Preble, 2005). Therefore, maintaining ties with key stakeholders and ensuring 
that their demands are addressed by the firm can help with firm profitability. On the other hand, 
ignoring stakeholders can lead to discontent and trigger consumer boycotts, negative publicity on 
the Web, lobbying of government officials for new protective legislation, all of which can 
potentially result in lost markets and revenue for the firm (Preble, 2005).  
Institutional theory also presents a powerful lens to examine why organizations adopt 
certain CSR strategies and not others; several studies have looked at the ways that institutions 
have constrained the actions of firms and encouraged them to act responsibly and ethically. 
Campbell (2007) looks at macro level institutional pressures such as the health of the economic 
environment, state regulations, the presence of private organizations such as NGOs and business 
associations and their impact on the adoption of CSR practices. Campbell suggests that 
organizations will be more likely to adopt socially responsible practices if the state imposes 
regulations, particularly if these regulations are well enforced. Normative pressures to act in 
socially responsible ways can come from being a member of business associations such as the 
chamber of commerce, which educate members on issues and encourage socially responsible 
actions (Campbell, 2007). Thus, firms operate within a set of political, economic and social 
institutions that affect their strategies (Campbell, 2007). The institutional pressures emanating 
from the different institutions in the firms’ institutional contexts create different motives and 
obstacles that can serve to promote or undermine socially responsible behavior. 
Jamali and Neville (2011) suggest that CSR practices in firms are not only influenced by 
the local business environment, which includes political, financial, educational and cultural 
institutions but also by legitimacy concerns and isomorphism. According to them, coercive 
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isomorphism will propel firms to comply with established rules, norms or laws, mimetic 
isomorphism will promote the adoption of recognized best practices and managerial fads, and 
normative isomorphism will lead firms to align their standards with those established by 
educational or professional authorities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
According to Bondy et al. (2012), studies that focus on institutional processes have 
contributed to our understanding of how pressures stemming from the government or financial 
institutions influence CSR practices, but they do not consider how companies respond 
strategically to these pressures. Rather, it is assumed that firms passively receive and then 
respond to pressures for particular CSR activities coming from outside the organization. “…the 
existing CSR and institutional theory literature suggests that CSR is done either by passive firms 
pressured by stakeholders, or because it improves profitability” (Bondy et al., 2012:282). Their 
2012 study on CSR in 37 different multinational corporations in the UK found that MNE 
subsidiaries demonstrate agency in determining how to respond to pressures for CSR. In addition, 
it found that the subsidiaries were turning CSR into a business innovation used to generate 
greater profits and that there was evidence of an institution of CSR within the MNE subsidiaries 
(Bondy et al., 2012). Therefore, MNE subsidiaries are in a position to shape CSR strategies in 
ways that are beneficial to them.  
Karam and Jamali (2013) have looked at the role CSR can play in advancing certain 
organizational goals or influencing social change. Their research suggests that CSR can be 
employed as a form of intentional institutional work to disrupt existing institutions and to bring 
about positive social change. Closely related to the current research, Avina’s 2013 research 
investigated the CSR strategies of MNE subsidiaries in the Middle East following the Arab 
Spring and found that many information technology companies such as Google, IBM, Nokia and 
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Samsung sponsored events in the Arab region to foster the development of applications that 
promote economic growth and democracy. 
For the purposes of this research, CSR initiatives or stakeholder relations (relationships 
with government, political, NGOs) are treated as institutional work when they are undertaken to 
influence the firm’s external environment allowing it to gain more legitimacy, repair damage to 




Every economy has a set of institutions that regulate and define how business activities 
are conducted.  Organizations, including multinational enterprises, have to adapt many of their 
practices and strategies to their local institutional environments in order to be successful. In the 
last decades, a large amount of research in international management has focused on the ways 
that regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions influence the business operations of 
firms (Scott, 2008). This research has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the 
strategies of MNEs with subsidiaries in countries with very different institutions than those of 
their home countries. In addition, MNE subsidiaries face the challenge of having to 
simultaneously adapt their strategies to multiple environments as a result of their boundary-
spanning operations (Kostova, 2008).  
Recent research has demonstrated that MNE subsidiaries can employ proactive and 
strategic actions within their institutional environments to positively influence outcomes. For 
example, as Regner and Edman’s (2014) research discusses, in the 1990s, Ericsson experienced 
difficulties in introducing mobile telephony in South East Asia because of the lack of existing 
regulations and the prevailing societal norms that questioned the value and need for mobile 
telecommunications. Ericsson was able to overcome these institutional hurdles by working with 
government agencies to change regulations that would support mobile telephony. Thus, 
organizations are influenced by institutions and vice versa, and as the concept of institutional 
work argues, there is a “permanent recursive and dialectical interaction between agency and 
institutions” (Lawrence et al. 2011: 55).  
If MNE subsidiaries have to adapt their strategies to the institutional environment while 
simultaneously taking strategic action to positively influence outcomes, they must also be 
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prepared for potential changes in the environment that can have a significant impact on their 
business operations. In fact, according to Lawrence et al. (2009), institutional fields in which 
ambiguity and uncertainty exist can provide opportunities for actors to use political and social 
skills to effect change because the latter have the ability to gain access to capabilities, assets, and 
networks. This study will investigate how MNE subsidiaries respond to local institutions in 
Morocco, including during periods of institutional change, as was the case following the Arab 
Spring.  
Based on the literature review and the above discussion, a theoretical model for MNE 
strategic responses is proposed (see figure 1). This theoretical model attempts to provide an 
overall picture of MNE strategic behavior in its host environment by showing the institutional 
pressures that the MNE faces, including during periods of institutional change triggered by an 
exogenous event (ex. the Arab Spring), and the corresponding strategies that it employs to 
maintain or repair legitimacy.  
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
  Exogenous Event: Arab Spring 
    
                                  
 
Institutional Demands   MNE Strategic Responses     Legitimacy maintenance or repair 
Regulative               Ignore                        Failure to legitimate the organization 
Cognitive              Conform 
Normative              Manipulate (Engaging in Institutional Work) 
       
                                       








Institutional environment  
For firms considering setting up operations in a given country, the institutional 
environment has become a crucial locational factor. Efficient markets depend on supporting 
institutions that can provide the formal and informal rules of a market economy, allowing lower 
transaction and information costs and reducing uncertainty (North, 1990). For example, in many 
developing and emerging markets, excessive red tape and bureaucracy and lack of protection for 
property rights can have a negative impact on MNE operations. Legal and government systems as 
well as informal institutions supporting an economy have a large influence on corporate strategies 
(Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2000). Research suggests that firms undertake foreign direct investment not 
only to have access to a larger market (i.e. by selling products in the local market) but also to 
augment resources and capabilities through interaction with diverse locations. However, firms 
seek investment locations where the institutional environment facilitates the development of their 
global firm-specific advantages (Rugman and Verbecke, 2002).  
Institutional Demands  
Within the institutional environment, there are institutional pressures exerted on 
organizations that are of a regulative, normative or cognitive nature. Regulative institutions 
include rules, laws or sanctions and are legally imposed. For example, an American MNE that 
becomes established in Morocco may have to comply with regulations that stipulate that 
companies in certain industries must limit the dividends they can take out of the country in their 
first years of operation. Normative institutions are societal expectations or values that must be 
adopted. For example, pressure to obtain accreditation or certification is a form of normative 
demand. An example specific to Middle Eastern societies is the Friday prayer – MNE 
subsidiaries have to adapt their work schedules to accommodate for the Friday prayer during 
which individuals are not working; normative institutions are morally governed. Cognitive 
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institutions are comprised of shared understandings of the way things are done in a particular 
organization or society. These institutions are taken-for-granted and persist because they become 
seen as the way things are done. For example, in Morocco there is an implicit acceptance by 
society of the informal economy, which is the production of goods and services, both legal and 
illegal, which is not included in the official estimates of GDP. Although the government loses tax 
revenue from unregulated business in this sector, the informal economy serves a purpose; 
approximately 30% of the workforce is employed by it (Saif, 2013). The three types of 
institutional pressures or demands provide a useful framework for comparing data across the 
cases, for generalizing findings and for contributing to existing theory. 
Exogenous event: Arab Spring  
This study seeks to investigate the ways that MNE subsidiaries respond to institutional 
demands that stem from specific regulative, normative and cognitive institutions in their 
environment, during stable periods but also during periods of institutional change. Does 
institutional change create greater constraints for MNE subsidiaries or does it provide them with 
opportunities to engage in institutional work? To explore this question, I examine the impact of 
the Arab Spring movement on MNE subsidiaries and the ways that they responded to the 
pressures and changes that resulted following the social movement.    
In early 2011, many demonstrations took place across the Middle East to protest against 
the existence of undemocratic and autocratic regimes, rampant corruption, high unemployment 
and a widening income disparity. As a result of the demonstrations, the rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Yemen were overthrown, significantly changing the political landscape. The 
monarchies of Morocco and Jordan made political changes, which helped them maintain their 
legitimacy and remain in power.   
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As a result of these events, many institutional changes took place including new 
government actors coming to power and individuals demanding to have a bigger role in the future 
of their societies.  MNE subsidiaries with operations in the Middle Eastern countries were 
impacted by the initial protests, which caused political turmoil and social unrest and by the 
changes in the political and social landscapes of these countries. (For more details on the social 
movement in Morocco, see the section below on the study context.)  
Strategic Responses   
Oliver defines strategic responses as “the strategic behaviors that organizations employ in 
direct response to institutional processes that affect them” (1995:145). Organization’s strategic 
responses range from passive conformity to proactive manipulation (Oliver 1995). This typology 
is especially relevant for MNE subsidiaries because for many MNE subsidiaries, conformity to 
local institutional settings is not a form of taken-for-granted behavior but instead a form of 
strategic agency.  
The study seeks to identify instances when MNE subsidiaries are either conforming to the 
institutional environment or manipulating it using different forms of institutional work in order to 
gain a positive outcome. (See Table 2 for different types of institutional work). Institutional work 
is treated as manipulating institutional demands because it involves intentional and proactive 
action taken by firms. The intentional actions taken by firms in relation to the government, 
political actors, and civil society are forms of institutional work aimed at improving outcomes for 
firms. In addition, corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies will be considered as a form of 




Table 2: Institutional Work    







Mobilizing political and regulatory support through direct and 
deliberate techniques of social suasion 
Defining  
 
Work aimed at the construction of rule systems that confer status or 
identity, define boundaries of membership or create status hierarchies 
within a field 
 
Vesting Refers to the institutional work directed toward the creation of rule 





Refers to institutional work at aimed at reconfiguring actors’ belief 




Refers to institutional work aimed at re-making the connections 





Educating actors in skills and knowledge necessary to support the 
new institution 
 
Enabling work Creating rules that facilitate, supplement and support institutions 
 
Based on Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
Research Questions 
The objective of this research is to gain insight on the ways that multinational enterprises 
adapt to their local environment and on the strategies that they employ during periods of 
institutional change, such as the one that followed the Arab Spring in many Middle Eastern 
countries. Thus the first research is: What are the strategic responses of MNE subsidiaries to the 
institutional pressures (regulative, normative, and cognitive) that they face in Morocco? The 
second research question is: How did the Arab Spring have an impact on local institutions and 
did the resulting institutional change create constraints or provide more opportunities for MNE 
subsidiaries  to engage in institutional work to positively influence outcomes?  
Relevant national contextual background  
Political  
Morocco is a country in North Africa located along the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea. It has a total area of 446,550 square kilometers and a population of nearly 34 
million people (KPMG Country Report, 2013). Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an 
elected parliament and a King that holds executive and legislative powers, notably over the 
military, foreign policy and religious affairs (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013). 
The Arab Spring Events  
The term “Arab Spring” refers to the wave of spontaneous uprisings, strikes and 
revolutions that broke out in the different countries of the Middle East as a result of numerous 
and varied institutional failings. The lack of democracy, low per capita income, a small middle 
class, large income gap, heavy dependence on government for livelihood, are all factors that 
served as catalysts for the protests and demands for change (Premsiggh, 2011; Springborg, 2011). 
The Arab Spring brought into light one of the most challenging problems facing the region today: 
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high unemployment rates especially among youth, women and the educated. The unemployment 
issue is the result of an underdeveloped private sector and a workforce that lacks the necessary 
skills to respond to business needs (World Economic Forum, 2013).  
Morocco was home to popular protests that were inspired by the events in Tunisia and 
Egypt. The first major demonstrations occurred on February 20
th
, 2011, when thousands of 
Moroccans called on Mohamed VI, the King of Morocco, to give up some of his powers, 
followed by weekly protests in multiple cities across the country to demand greater democracy 
and a crackdown on government corruption. On March 21, 2011 tens of thousands called for 
political, constitutional and economic reforms in more than 60 Moroccan cities. Social networks, 
such Facebook, played an important role in helping the demonstrators organize protests and raise 
awareness about unfolding events. Social media also gave the protesters additional channels to 
bypass conventional media, which is more closely controlled by the state. Some of the protests 
were marked by anti-American sentiment related to American involvement in the affairs of 
Middle Eastern countries, including support for authoritarian rulers such as Egypt’s Hosni 
Mubarak, whose regime lasted for decades (KPMG Country Report, 2013). Following the 
protests, King Mohamed IV announced that he would overhaul the constitution and set up a 
handpicked committee to draft changes by the end of 2011, which would include a strong 
parliament, a bigger role for local officials and an independent judiciary.  
The Moroccan population voted for the new constitution by referendum in July 2011. 
Parliamentary elections were held in 2011 instead of 2012 and a prominent moderate Islamist 
Party, the Justice and Development Party, won the most number of seats and become the first 
Islamist party to lead the government in Morocco. The government also agreed to raise public-
sector salaries and the minimum wages in the public and private sectors in response to growing 
demands from labor unions and public protests (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011).  
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The introduction of the constitution had an impact on several formal institutions. For 
example, it granted the government executive powers, but retained the King as head of the army, 
religious authorities, and the judiciary (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011). In addition, it 
incorporated the claims of key social groups such as Amazigh individuals (Berbers) and 
recognized Amazigh as an official language. It also acknowledged some fundamental human 
rights for both men and women and institutionalized gender equality by encouraging the creation 
of women’s rights organizations and giving women more legal rights (asking for divorce and 



















Table 3 Summary: Institutional Evolution in Morocco Following the Arab Spring 
Institutions 




Constitutional reforms:  
Prime Minister and the Parliament are 
granted more power (Economic 
intelligence unit, 2011)  
 
The recognition of cultural and 
linguistic plurality; Amazigh (Berber 
language) recognized as an official 
language (Lewis, 2011)  
 
Entrenchment of equality of civil, 
economic and cultural rights of both 
men and women (Economic intelligence 
unit, 2011)  
 
Norms:  
Use of social media to denounce 
government repression and to 
organize protests (Browning, 2013)  
 
Anti-American sentiment (KPMG 
Country, Report 2013)  
2012 New Institutions:  
Rise of religious political powers (new 
government elected in legislative 
elections was the Party of Justice and 
Development, an Islamist conservative 
party) (Economic intelligence unit, 
2011)  
 
New constitution makes commitments 
to gender parity in government 
(Economic intelligence unit, 2011)  
 
Norms: 
Greater awareness about the 
importance of CSR programs (Avina, 
2013) 
 
Rise of religious groups/Islamist 
ideology (Economic intelligence 
unit, 2011)  
 
The impact of the Arab Spring was more significant in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia where 
the regimes of these countries, which had been in power for decades, were overthrown following 
massive demonstrations and were replaced with interim governments. Domestic and international 
firms in these countries were impacted by the institutional instability that resulted following the 
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protests and the changes in government actors. Firms were also impacted by the economic 
problems that resulted following the Arab Spring in the Middle East.  
This research focused on MNE subunits operating in Morocco. However, after 
interviewing the Country Manager of MNE in Morocco, there was an opportunity to conduct 
interviews with the country managers of Tunisia and Egypt and the data from those interviews 
was subsequently included in the study.  
Economic  
Morocco enjoys a diverse, open and market-oriented economy and has capitalized on its 
proximity to Europe to improve its competitiveness. In 2014, its GDP was $103.8 billion (World 
Bank, 2014). The strongest sectors in the economy include agriculture, tourism, phosphates, 
textiles, apparel and subcomponents. Despite the country’s progress, it suffers from high 
unemployment and poverty. Key economic challenges for the country include combating 
corruption, curbing government spending, improving the educational system and judiciary, 
addressing socioeconomic gaps, and building more diversified and value-added industries 
(KPMG Country, Report 2013).  
Language 
Morocco’s official languages are Arabic and Berber. Moroccan people communicate in a 
type of dialect unique to Morocco referred to as Darija. Similarly to its North African neighbors, 
Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco uses French in governmental institutions, media, private firms, 
international commerce with French speaking countries, and in international affairs and 




Education in Morocco is compulsory and free for students up to age 15. However, many 
children, particularly girls in rural areas, do not attend school and the country’s literacy rate is at 
68.5 %, one of the lowest in the region (KPMG Country Report, 2013).  
Religion  
The large majority of Moroccans are of the Muslim faith (98.7%). The Christian 
population accounts for 1.1% and the Jewish one for 0.2%. Morocco’s Jewish minority has 
significantly decreased since the Second World War (265,000 in 1948 versus about 5,500 in 
2014) (KPMG Country Report, 2013).  
Corruption  
Morocco has a wide body of laws and regulations to combat corruption. Since 2009, an 
anti-corruption agency headed by a senior Moroccan official, has been active in corruption 
efforts. The agency was created to educate Moroccans on anti-corruption practices and to propose 
specific steps the government can take to address the issue. In 2010, an anti-corruption hotline 
was introduced allowing people to report incidences of bribery or corruption. Despite these 
efforts, Morocco suffers from widespread corruption, which undermines investor confidence and 
increases the cost of operating a business (KPMG Country Report, 2013).  
While initiatives to combat corruption are notable, the underlying cultural context 
allowing these practices to take place has yet to be addressed. Any effective laws and regulations 
pertaining to corruption will have to take account the cultural force of Wasta, which refers to 
connections, clout or influence. Individuals use their influence to perform services. The 
prevalence of Wasta is intrinsic in Moroccan society and is a part of conducting business. For 
Western firms doing business in Morocco or other countries in the Arab world, Wasta practices 
can lead to liability under anti-corruption laws, including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
Similar practices exist in China and are referred to as Guanxi (Tarnovskaya, 2012).  
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CSR Institutional Infrastructure  
Corporate Social Responsibility as an institution has gained strength as Morocco expands 
economically and becomes more stable. The country’s firms are gradually becoming more 
socially responsible and considering the impact of their activities on the environment, 
communities, employees and consumers. For example, the General Federation of Moroccan 
Business (CGEM), an employer’s association has started awarding social labels to companies 
based on an analysis of the impact of their activities. While there are no laws that mandate 
specific levels of CSR, both MNE subsidiaries and local firms follow certain principles such as 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) CSR guidelines for 
multinational companies. NGOs are also taking an increasingly active role in monitoring 
corporations’ CSR performance (KPMG Country Report, 2013).  
Research Design 
A case study approach was chosen to investigate the research questions because little 
research has been conducted on the institutional work employed by multinational corporations in 
their host environments and thus exploratory research is necessary. This research strategy is 
useful in new or little investigated scientific fields as it can help identify emergent themes and 
increase understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Mintzberg, 1979; Eisenhardt, 
1989 b.) The case study approach can also help provide an in-depth understanding of the 
organization and its environment. Collecting rich data through qualitative research allows for the 
consideration of context-specific factors and the identification of complex patterns (Yin, 2003).  
Case Selection  
The study consisted of a sample of 12 multinational subunits (10 operating in Morocco, 
one operating in Egypt and one operating in Tunisia). There were several conditions for the 
selection of MNE subsidiaries that were to be part of the study. The first condition was that the 
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MNE subsidiaries originated from developed nations and had business operations in Morocco. 
MNE subsidiaries from developed countries face greater institutional pressures as a result of the 
differences in institutions between developed and emerging markets, and their strategic responses 
will be more visible in such a context. The second condition was that the MNE subsidiaries 
needed to have been operating in Morocco for several years, including in 2011, when the Arab 
Spring events took place.   
According to Schneiberg and Clemens (2006), institutional interactions are most visible 
during times of upheaval and change, when prevailing behaviors and norms are challenged. Thus, 
as much as possible, the firms that were solicited to participate in the study had experienced 
pressure or challenges during the Arab Spring, which triggered purposive responses on their part 
and made the strategic responses to institutions more visible.  
For each case, I investigated MNE interactions relating to regulative, normative, and 
cognitive demands in their environment, the impact of the Arab Spring on these institutions and 
the ways that MNE subsidiaries responded through institutional work. As company strategies are 
often sensitive topics, a final condition was that the interviewees were willing to share 
information about their company and that rich secondary data was available. For respondents that 
did not provide sufficient data, extensive secondary research was conducted to supplement the 
interview data.  
Data Collection and Methods 
The list of firms solicited was drawn from various sources, including the Internet, a list of 
American companies belonging to the American Chamber of Commerce in Morocco, and finally 
from personal contacts. Although information was collected through individual interviews, it is 
assumed that the data collected applies at the level of the organization (the Moroccan subsidiary). 
I asked the respondents to focus on the constraints and strategies of the subsidiary or else to 
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specify when they were discussing the parent company or other subsidiaries. As much as 
possible, the interviews were conducted with high-level management of the subsidiaries who are 
involved at the strategy level of their firm (Human Resources Director, Communications 
Directors, Country Managers, General Manager and Finance Director). The recruitment method 
involved sending emails or LinkedIn messages to contacts at MNE subsidiaries and calling them 
to schedule an interview.  
The industries of the companies interviewed varied from pharmaceutical, software, 
environmental services, consumer goods, electrical services, automobile, information technology 
and tourism. Between November 2013 and June 2014, 12 in-depth semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with high-level employees at the MNE subsidiaries.  
 Eleven in person interviews were conducted, ten with informants working in subsidiaries 
operating in Morocco and one with an informant working at an MNE subsidiary in Tunisia (he 
was in Morocco to attend a meeting with the Moroccan subsidiary). One interview was conducted 
over the phone with the Country Manager of an MNE subsidiary in Egypt. On average, the 
interviews lasted for 45 minutes. A semi-structured questionnaire was used for the interviews 
with open-ended questions designed to elicit responses. The interviewer probed for specific 
issues of interest. The interview protocol was modeled after a study by Alimadadi et al. titled 
Business, Society and Politics: Multinationals in Emerging Markets, published in the 
International Business and Management Journal (2012). The interview guide had three foci 1) the 
institutional pressures experienced by MNE subsidiaries in Morocco and the ways that they 
respond to them 2) the impact of the Arab Spring on MNE operations 3) the strategic responses 
of MNE subsidiaries to the institutional changes that occurred following the Arab Spring events 
(See Interview Protocol in the Appendix).  
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The materials collected for the purposes of the research came from several sources, 
including secondary sources (company reports, financial reports, press releases and news reports) 
and the interviews that were conducted. Interviews were an important source of information to 
gain insight on company strategies and the secondary data was helpful to contextualize the 
detailed primary data. The use of interviews and data from secondary sources permitted 
triangulation across and within the different data sources (Welch, 2004) and increased the 
validity of the data and of the analysis. To facilitate the data analysis, case narratives were 
developed (using both secondary and primary sources) on the ways in which MNE subsidiaries 
employ strategic responses to the institutions that permeate their institutional environments. The 
case narratives provided a fuller picture of the MNE subsidiary experience in Morocco and 
allowed the researcher to identify important insights about the organization and its strategic 
responses. Data analysis also included coding the interview data, which will be discussed in the 
next section. For confidentiality reasons, the study does not include the names of the 
multinational enterprises and instead refers to them as MNE 1 subsidiary, MNE 2 subsidiary, 
MNE 3 subsidiary, etc.  
The level of analysis was at the MNE subsidiary as the research objective was to gain 
insight on the ways that MNE subsidiaries respond to their institutional contexts, including the 
strategies that the subsidiaries use to adapt to local business-specific regulations, norms and 
customs. The unit of analysis was the MNE subsidiaries’ responses to institutional pressures in 
their host environment.   
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Table 4 Overview of data sources 



















interviewed by type 
MNE 1 
subsidiary   
Hotels $6.14 
billion  















Logistics  $63.6 
million  





















Consumer goods $83.06 
billion 




Automotive $46.1  
billion  
 







Pharmaceuticals  $38 
billion  
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Data Coding & Analysis 
Eight out of twelve interviews were conducted in French, the rest were conducted in 
English. After translating the interviews conducted in French into English, I transcribed the data 
and used the Hyper Research software to code and organize it. To appreciate the complexity of 
each interview, I coded on a within-case basis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). My coding strategy 
was qualitative and did not involve counting words or phrases. In fact, the main objective of the 
coding was to interpret the information and to draw conclusions about meanings, processes, and 
actions (Langley, 1999). Using HyperResearch, I coded all the interview data, which essentially 
involved summarizing the information into thematically relevant categories. This yielded dozens 
of categories per firm. For example, for institutional pressures, the codes applied included 
“corruption”, “cultural constraints”, “bureaucracy”, and “Islamic practice”. Since one of the 
objectives of the research was to identify the types of institutional demands faced by firms, I 
grouped the initial codes under the thematic labels of “regulative”, “normative”, “cultural-
cognitive”. A second objective was to identify the strategic responses of MNE subsidiaries, 
including the institutional work that they engaged in to influence institutions; therefore, I coded 
for types of institutional work set against those developed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006).  
This process allowed me to sort the data and to identify the most common types of institutional 
work employed by the MNE subsidiaries. Certain strategies, however, did not fit under any of the 
types of institutional work identified by Lawrence and Suddaby, and I coded them accordingly. 
Another objective of the research was to identify the institutional pressures caused by the Arab 
Spring; the major codes that emerged included “security problems”, “revenue loss”, and “stress 
of employees”. To identify MNE responses to the institutional pressures triggered by the Arab 
Spring, I also coded for types of institutional work.   
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The findings emerged in a three-stage process. In the first stage, I identified the types of 
institutional demands faced by each MNE subunit using Scott’s pillars – regulative, normative 
and cognitive demands. MNE subsidiaries with operations in Morocco face distinct regulative, 
normative and cognitive demands. Next, I identified the strategic responses that MNE 
subsidiaries used to manage each of the institutional demand that they faced. The next stage of 
the analysis involved identifying the ways that the Arab Spring, which led to institutional 
upheaval, had an impact on institutional conditions. In the final stage of the analysis, I identified 
how the institutional change provoked by the Arab Spring created greater opportunities for MNE 
subsidiaries to engage in institutional work. Cross-case synthesis was used to contrast firms 
across multiple categories (Yin, 1994) and to draw some generalizations about the findings. This 
technique is relevant if the study consists of at least two studies; the analysis is likely to improve 
if there is more than one case study (Yin, 1989).  It is important to note that only the primary data 
was coded. The secondary archival data collected was used to develop individual case studies 




Overview of Findings  
This research study set out to investigate the types of challenges or constraints that 
international MNE subsidiaries experience in the Moroccan institutional context, as well as some 
of the strategies that these firms employ to overcome them. In addition to identifying the major 
institutional pressures encountered by firms, the research also attempted to uncover if the 
institutional changes provoked by the Arab Spring provided opportunities for MNE subsidiaries 
to use specific strategies aimed at improving their business environment.  
The study demonstrated that MNE subsidiaries face specific institutional pressures that 
stem from regulative, normative and cognitive demands within the Moroccan institutional 
context. Consistent with one of the main premises of institutional theory, many of these 
institutions were found to constrain the actions of MNE subsidiaries. For instance, in terms of 
regulative pressures, many firms indicated that the ineffective bureaucracy and administrative 
slowness had an impact on their business operations. However, the study also found that MNE 
subsidiaries  are not simply pawns in the institutional environment; in fact, these firms employ 
specific strategies such as advocacy and relationship building to overcome regulatory challenges.  
The research demonstrated that the institutional instability caused by the Arab Spring 
aggravated some of the institutional pressures experienced by MNE subsidiaries; for example, 
many MNE subsidiaries were impacted by the government instability that resulted and its 
consequences, including delays in payment for products and services provided to public sector 
clients and lack of decision-making for contracts that MNE subsidiaries were bidding for.  
However, in many instances, the institutional changes that resulted from the events also provided 
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MNE subsidiaries with an opportunity to engage in institutional work to advance their own 
interests.   
The next section will begin by outlining some of the main institutional pressures that were 
found to impact the business operations of MNE subsidiaries in Morocco, followed by examples 
of institutional work that MNE subsidiaries employ to overcome these institutional pressures. 
Finally, the section will conclude with a description of how the institutional change provoked by 
the Arab Spring created constraints but also opportunities for MNE subsidiaries to engage in 
institutional work.    
Institutional Demands in the MNE Institutional Environment  
Regulative demands  
The institutional environment of firms is composed of the legal and administrative 
framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact to create wealth (WEF 
2014-2015). Regulative institutions include the rules, regulations and laws that exist within an 
institutional environment; the strength of the institutions will determine whether the latter will be 
successfully enforced. In many developing and emerging economies, there are weak regulatory 
environments, certain laws cannot be successfully enforced and the business practices that result, 
such as corruption, can undermine markets (Meyer et al., 2008).  
This research indicates that although Morocco has made significant improvements in 
terms of liberalizing and opening up its market and simplifying some administrative procedures 
such as shortening the number of days it takes to open a company, firms still face important 
regulatory constraints. The inefficient bureaucracy, red tape and administrative slowness in 
Morocco have a negative impact on MNE operations and increases costs for them. The subsidiary 
of MNE 1, a global company in the hotel industry, indicated that it was often a slow and arduous 
process to obtain construction permits. The subsidiary of MNE 8, a global pharmaceutical 
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company, faces regulatory constraints in the form of long delays to obtain authorizations from the 
health authorities to market medication or health products.  
A by-product of the inefficiency of the system is corruption. According to the General 
Manager and Finance Director of MNE 2, a global electrical engineering firm, the company has 
“to pay for every paper” to speed up procedures such as the legalization of documents at 
government administrations. As a result of the red tape and slow administrative procedures, 
companies pay small amounts to government officials to speed up the process of legalizing 
documents or obtaining forms. With time, petty corruption has become institutionalized and 
companies can even be directly solicited. The General Manager and Finance Director of MNE 2 
noted: “Corruption is a long-term problem. It is not something you can fix with procedures, 
although they can help. It is a problem of governance. The system is corrupt, slow and inefficient 
and sanctions against corruption are ineffective. It is the governments of these countries that can 
change this. Multinational corporations cannot.”  
All the MNE subsidiaries  in the study recognized the existence of corrupt business 
practices in Morocco, however, most indicated that their status as multinationals did not enable 
them to engage in any kind of inducement, even if it were to help speed up processes and render 
their business operations more effective. In fact, they explained that all MNE subsidiaries 
worldwide received training on corruption and that it was part of their organizational identity to 
refrain from any type of inducement. For example, according to the Human Resources Director at 
the MNE 4 subsidiary:  
“It is a Swedish company; you must know Swedish culture. [MNE] is very clear and that 
is what makes us what we are. We are known for our products, the quality of the services we 
offer and the competence of our employees. If we are not selected based on these three criteria, 
we don’t want to be selected. We don’t want to be selected because we have relationships with 
political leaders; we can’t give bribes, we can’t give presents, we are very strict.” 
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However, the topic of corruption or inducement is a sensitive one. Even if the subsidiaries  
do engage in petty corruption practices to facilitate their business transactions or administrative 
processes in Morocco, it may not be a topic that they will openly discuss for fear of damaging 
their reputations – be it at the subsidiary level or the headquarter level.  
Another regulative challenge that several subsidiaries face is the existence of a large and 
thriving informal economy, which includes a market for counterfeited goods where imitations of 
MNE products are sold. The effects are worse for some MNEs than for others depending on the 
industry that they operate in.  
The findings of the study are consistent with the World Economic Forum 2014-2015 
report, which cites inefficient government bureaucracy and corruption as some of the most 















Figure 2: The most problematic factors for doing business  
  
Normative demands 
Normative demands are based on values and norms that describe how an individual or an 
organization should act. These demands are not enforced by coercion but rather by a code of 
conduct that entails moral or social obligations (Ionascu et al. 2004). The MNE subsidiaries in the 
study indicated that they have adapted to the normative institutional environment. For example, 
all MNE subsidiaries have designated prayer rooms in their offices for their employees. 
Expatriates are specifically trained on cultural issues such as religion when they join the 
Moroccan subsidiaries so that they are aware of what constitutes appropriate behavior in the local 
environment. The MNE subsidiaries emphasized that they respected Islamic practice and that it 
was an element that they take into consideration in their everyday business practices. For 
example, meetings are not scheduled early Friday afternoons because individuals go to prayer. 
MNE subsidiaries also take care of administrative issues at government administrations on Friday 
mornings, rather than Friday afternoons.   
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The subsidiary of MNE 10, a global firm that specializes in environmental services, faced 
normative pressures in the Moroccan institutional environment for several reasons. It was 
criticized for not being sensitive enough to cultural norms. For example, many people 
complained about some of its advertisements, which depicted women not wearing a veil. The 
criticism was particularly strong in the north of the country which is more conservative; the 
subsidiary responded by first removing all visuals from its advertisements and then depicting a 
family, which was more acceptable to the most conservative segments of society. The company 
also faced normative pressure as it was perceived negatively by the population who accused it of 
charging exorbitant prices for public utilities and of not investing enough in infrastructure for 
water and electricity services in Morocco.  
Cognitive-cultural demands 
Cultural-cognitive demands refer to the underlying shared ideas and beliefs in an 
institutional environment that make up social reality. These institutions include stereotypes, 
symbols, words, and cultural notions that are taken-for-granted in society (Ionascu et al., 2004). 
In terms of cognitive demands in the institutional environment, several MNE subunits noted the 
importance of building relational ties with local actors. According to the Country Manager of the 
MNE 1 subsidiary, “when you build ties things go faster.” In many cases it is expected for 
companies to build relationships with local government or political actors and professional 
associations to operate more efficiently in the institutional context. Similarly to other Middle 
Eastern countries, it is easier for companies to conduct business if they have the right contacts. 
This notion is known as Wasta, and loosely translates to personal contacts; one’s connections can 
help things get done and influence outcomes. Therefore, it is imperative to build personal 
relationships with key individuals such as government actors. Sometimes this involves doing 
small favors for them; it is a cultivation strategy that is based on the long-term and that helps 
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businesses operate effectively within their environment. The General Manager and Finance 
Director of MNE 2 noted the importance of building relationships with local actors that are based 
on trust in order to efficiently conduct business. The Business Development Director of MNE 1, 
in the hotel sector, indicated that it was important to begin meetings with informal exchanges and 
to inquire about business partners’ families before discussing work matters. This form of 
exchange is very different from Western approaches where meetings begin with the business 
matters to be addressed and where efficiency is the goal. The MNE subsidiaries in the study 
emphasized the importance of establishing and maintaining good relationships with Moroccan 
government officials at all levels. Other cognitive pressures that MNE subsidiaries  face result 
from the lack of understanding on the part of key actors, such as government officials, about the 
utility or benefits of MNE subsidiaries ’ products or services such as certain technological 
services, which can make it more challenging to obtain approvals.    
MNE Responses to Institutional Pressures  
 The notion of institutional work describes the purposeful action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006). These actions range from highly visible and dramatic actions to effect change to nearly 
invisible and mundane day-to-day adjustments that actors engage in within their institutional 
environments (Lawrence et al., 2009). Through the data analysis, several themes emerged with 
regards to the kinds of strategic responses or institutional work that MNE subsidiaries employ to 
overcome institutional demands within their institutional environments. The research found that 
the MNE subsidiaries employed specific strategies to influence institutions favorably. In support 
of the notion of institutional work, this research has found that MNE subsidiaries are active 
agents that strive to manipulate their institutional environments in order to overcome existing 
pressures in their environment and to create new opportunities. Thus, MNE subsidiaries are 
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active agents and use specific strategies to overcome some of the pressures that they experience. 
However, as it may be expected, it was found that MNE subsidiaries are more likely to use 
proactive strategies to manage regulatory demands and to conform to normative and cognitive-
cultural demands such as adapting to religious norms and engaging in Wasta. This section will 
present the strategies that were used by firms to overcome the institutional pressures that they 
faced within their institutional environment.   
Advocacy  
All MNE subsidiaries indicated that Morocco had made some progress in strengthening 
its formal institutions and improving the business environment, however, there are still some 
issues related to excessive bureaucracy, red tape and corruption. MNE subsidiaries are confronted 
with these institutional challenges and must manage them in their everyday operations. One of 
the ways in which they do so is by starting and maintaining a dialogue with government and 
political actors and engaging in advocacy to promote their interests.  
For the subsidiary of MNE 1, the global hotel operator, obtaining a permit to build a hotel 
can be a very lengthy process, which significantly slows down projects. One of the ways that 
MNE 1 overcomes this constraint is by reaching out to key contacts in the government and 
engaging in lobbying. According to the Business Development Director: “The advantage that we 
have in Morocco is that we are well implemented, and that we know the market well. We know a 
lot of people, at the level of the administrations, at the level of the Wali (regional governor), so 
this is what allows us to accelerate getting authorizations for projects.” The company also lobbies 
the Ministry of Tourism to accelerate obtaining approvals, maintains a wide network of 
relationships and engages in lobbying with officials at high levels to help advance its project and 
overcome administrative slowness.  
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In addition, the subsidiary of MNE 1 engages in advocacy to obtain authorizations to buy 
land to build hotels or to secure contracts for the management of local hotels instead of its 
competitors. According to the respondent, the company engages in lobbying because “In the 
Maghreb and in Africa, given the level of development, which is less advanced, the rules of the 
game are perhaps less clear than in Europe.” This finding lends further support to the concept of 
Wasta, which appears to have a significant impact on firms, including MNE subsidiaries. In fact, 
MNE 1 engages in lobbying to gain the support of key actors that are in power and that can exert 
pressure so that the company secures contracts instead of its competitors. An important finding of 
the study is that building ties with local government or political actors is both a cultural 
expectation, Wasta, but it also emerges as a strategic option for firms that engage in relationship 
building and advocacy in response to the weakness of formal institutions. MNE subsidiaries build 
relationships with political actors to gain support for their lobbying efforts. 
The subsidiary of MNE 8, the global pharmaceutical manufacturer, is impacted by 
important administrative delays. Before selling a medication or health product on the Moroccan 
market, it must deposit a file with the health authorities and the Ministry of health to obtain 
authorizations and a selling price, processes that can be lengthy. The subsidiary has a public 
affairs department that communicates with the health authorities to speed up processes and 
manages other key relationships, including with the Ministry of Health.  
MNE subsidiaries also lobby the government to bring changes to laws and regulations and 
to streamline processes. The subsidiary of MNE 2, the electrical engineering firm, has been 
lobbying the government to take measures to ensure the application of a law that penalizes delays 
in payment. One of the biggest challenges faced by local and international firms in Morocco are 
delays in payment from public and private sector clients for services rendered. To fight against 
payment delays that are too lengthy, Morocco adopted the law 32-10 in 2011, which sets 
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penalties for delays that are between 60 and 90 days. However, despite companies’ lobbying 
efforts, the law could not be applied. The subsidiary of MNE 9, in the energy sector, also suffers 
from issues related to delays in payment from public sector clients and regularly organizes 
meetings with its clients to try to devise better processes to speed up payments. The subsidiary of 
MNE 5, a global firm that offers computer software and hardware, lobbies the government to 
change laws concerning technology, electronic commerce or the Internet that are disadvantageous 
to the firm. For example, when there are proposals to limit access to the Internet, the company 
engages in lobbying and outlines the potential issues of limiting the Internet, including slowing 
down innovation in Morocco.   
MNE subsidiaries also engage in lobbying to change cognitive perceptions. For example, 
MNE 4 in the telecommunications sector often faces resistance when it seeks to launch a new 
product or service. The resistance comes from different actors, including government, who do not 
understand the benefit or utility of its technological services. The company engages in lobbying 
to explain the benefits of the services and overcome some of the resistance of key government 
players. MNE 4 has been attempting to implement a service that would allow individuals to pay 
the highway toll by phone and has been discussing this new service with the Ministry of 
Transport. MNE 4 engages in lobbying to promote the greater use of technology in different 
industries. 
Finally, it was found that MNE subsidiaries engage in lobbying to create opportunities for 
partnerships with the authorities. For example, after having invested 20 million Euros for the 
creation of a logistic and distribution platform in Morocco, MNE 8, in pharmaceuticals, lobbied 
the government for a public-private partnership to jointly develop programs addressing the 
prevention and diagnosis of several diseases. The logistics platform was inaugurated in 2013, and 
concluded with the signing of three conventions to increase support for patients suffering from 
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diabetes, mental health issues or epilepsy and to train more people for careers in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
Leveraging local organizations   
According to Lawrence and Suddaby (2005), interest associations or organizations that 
are formally created to represent groups also engage in institutional work. This work involves 
lobbying for resources, promoting agendas and proposing new legislation to highlight the 
interests of specific actors. This research found that most MNE subsidiaries are members of local 
business groups that help them navigate through the local environment including lobbying for 
material resources or for the social and political capital needed to create new institutional 
structures or practices. For example, eight MNE subsidiaries out of ten operating in Morocco are 
members of the Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), which is an 
employer’s association that regroups several local and international enterprises.  According to the 
Business Development Director of MNE 1, in the tourism sector, “the CGEM is a great platform 
to build relationships within the local business environment. It helps us build relationships and is 
a source of lobbying to change laws or legislation.” The company is going to engage in lobbying 
via the CGEM to change an investment law that currently only grants fiscal advantages to large-
scale projects. MNE 2, the electrical engineering firm, also actively participates in CGEM 
workgroup committees. For example, when there are tax proposals or other economic measures 
proposed by the government, the company make suggestions and discuss matters with the 
ministers through the workgroup committees. The Communications Director of MNE 9, in the 
energy sector, stated: “The CGEM plays a facilitator role to discuss things with the different 
ministries.” 
The research also found that many companies are members of professional organizations 
that correspond to their industries: L’Association Nationale des Investisseurs Touristique 
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(National Association for Tourism Investors), La Fédération Nationale de l’Elétricité, de 
l’Électronique et des Energie Renouvables (National Federation of Electricity, Electronics and 
Renewable Energies), l'Association Marocaine pour La Logistique (Moroccan Association for 
Logistics), Maroc Innovation & Santé (Morocco Health & Innovation), Association des 
Importeurs Des Véhicles au Maroc (Association for Importers of Vehicles in Morocco). Similarly 
to their role within the CGEM workgroup committees, the MNE subsidiaries work with these 
associations to influence laws, regulations, or to make government proposals. For example, if 
there are changes in import tax regulations that are not advantageous to companies in the 
automobile industry, the Association for Importers of Vehicles in Morocco will lobby the 
government on behalf of these companies. The MNE 8 subsidiary, in the pharmaceutical sector, 
employs the association Morocco Health & Innovation as a platform to discuss issues related to 
insufficient medical coverage with the government. The General Manager and Finance Director 
of MNE 2, the electrical engineering firm, noted: “Working with professional organization opens 
up doors to push company agendas more easily that if the company were on its own.”  
Use of Internal Dedicated Services  
Several companies indicated that they have internal dedicated services that worked with 
external stakeholders to simplify and facilitate processes for the company. These dedicated 
structures are unique to the Moroccan subsidiaries and allow the MNE subsidiaries to respond to 
particular institutional constraints that may arise. For example, the subsidiary of MNE 7, the 
global automobile manufacturer, has set up dedicated services internally for all its important 
functions, including import, registration, and logistics, whose mandate is to work directly with 
government administrations. These specialized departments allow MNE subsidiaries not only to 
simplify processes but also to manage and anticipate any problems that may arise with the 
authorities. For example, according to the respondent from MNE 6, in the consumer goods sector, 
54 
 
there is a large amount of administrative work to be completed by the company for the import of 
products, particularly for new products. Obtaining authorizations can take a long time, which 
represents an additional step when considering the launch of a new product in Morocco. The 
MNE has a department that takes care of registration and is in regular contact with the different 
ministries, presenting the products to them and explaining their benefit. Therefore, these 
dedicated structures maintain key contacts, are informed of administrative procedures, which 
helps them manage some of the administrative challenges within the institutional context.  
Defining  
The second type of institutional work that is aimed at creating institutions, identified in 
this research is ‘defining’. According to Lawrence and Suddaby (2005) defining involves “the 
construction of rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of membership, or 
create hierarchies within a field” (17). This includes formal accreditation processes, the creation 
of standards and the certification of actors within a field. The emergence and diffusion of ISO 
practices globally involves the use of definitional work from key actors in different industries 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2005).  
The research identified several instances of MNE subsidiaries employing definitional 
work to improve processes or facilitate their business operations in Morocco. For example, the 
MNE 1 subsidiary, the hotel operator, partnered with other major actors in the tourism industry 
including tourism investment funds, developers, hotel owner groups and large hotel chains to 
create l’Association Nationale des Investisseurs Touristique (The National Association of 
Tourism Investors). This association was created in 2010 to support the government in the 
implementation of the new tourism policy in Morocco. The association provides an institutional 
structure with defined boundaries of membership in which MNE 1 and other investors in the 
tourism industry can engage in lobbying the Finance, Commerce and Tourism Ministries to bring 
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about changes in laws or regulations. This new body creates a space for reflection, proposals and 
negotiation on all issues related to tourism investment in Morocco. The association also 
encourages partnerships and dialogue with the authorities and private or public institutions, both 
national and international.  
As discussed above, several MNE subsidiaries indicated that they have created internal 
dedicated structures that are unique to the Moroccan subsidiary to respond to the complex local 
environment. Creating dedicated services within companies that are in charge of managing 
relationships and transactions with public authorities and other stakeholders is also a form of 
definitional work. According to the subsidiaries of MNE 6 and MNE 7, which both have 
established internal dedicated services, these structures facilitate the process of explaining the 
benefits of projects to the authorities and of attempting to influence standards or norms. Thus, the 
dedicated services put in place by MNE subsidiaries allows them to establish work perimeters 
within which specific institutional structures and practices can take place.   
Another finding was that MNE 7, in the automotive industry, was able to influence an 
industry through definitional institutional work. In 2011, the company established a major 
automotive plant in the North of Morocco for the manufacturing of cars for export to Europe. 
Prior to the establishment of the plant, there had been only one small factory in Morocco that the 
MNE also owned. The rest of the automobile companies were dealerships that imported cars and 
sold them in Morocco. Therefore, there was no ‘culture’ of automobile manufacturing in 
Morocco, or any educational programs on the design or manufacturing of automobiles. In 
partnership with the government, the company created a cutting edge institute to accompany the 
new factory, where new company recruits were trained in automobile manufacturing. Thus the 
MNE successfully established new practices in the industry related to the construction of 
automobiles, which may encourage other MNE subsidiaries  to open automobile factories in 
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Morocco. Furthermore, as a result of the creation of the factory, local and international auto part 
makers have also been established in Morocco, which will strengthen the creation of an 
automobile industry.  
Another MNE engaged in definitional institutional work. In 2011, the subsidiary of MNE 
3, in the express logistics industry, invested 6 million dollars USD to create a shipping hub in the 
Casablanca airport. The hub includes technical facilities that are up to international standards and 
is TAPA certified, which is a global certification standard for security. It also has an advanced 
security system to help ensure cargo safety in storage facilities and during transit to reduce the 
risk of criminal activity. The new technical installations enable the MNE 3 subsidiary to ensure 
the processing of shipments of customers both for import and export with maximum efficiency, 
have improved security and shorter transit. Since the MNE obtained its TAPA certification, other 
international logistics companies have also received certification to ensure greater security in 
their hubs in Morocco.  
Several MNE subsidiaries in the study indicated that although they were solicited with 
demands of petty corruption in their business operations when dealing with different 
stakeholders, their MNE status did not allow them to engage in any form of inducement. 
Compared to local firms, MNE subsidiaries have clearer processes and rules and engage in 
definitional work that upholds their status or identities as global companies with clear rules and 
ethical practices. Whether MNE subsidiaries are able to influence local companies in also 
adopting ethical and transparent business practices in their operations and redefining how 
corruption is perceived in society, is less clear. 
Educating   
 According to Lawrence and Suddaby (2005), ‘educating’ is a form of institutional work 
aimed at creating institutions that involves teaching actors the skills and knowledge necessary to 
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support new institutions. One key strategy to engage in educating is to create templates or 
frameworks that will provide actors with an outline to guide action. The study identified several 
instances of MNE subsidiaries engaging in this type of institutional work (Lawrence and 
Suddaby, 2005).  
As discussed above, when the subsidiary of MNE 7 established its automotive factory, it 
required individuals to run the plant and participated in the creation of a training institute, in 
partnership with the government. The company brought specialists from France and other 
subsidiaries to establish the factory, create processes and to provide training for the different 
tasks required at the plant. By bringing individuals from its factories in France and other 
countries, the MNE was able to educate employees with the knowledge necessary to engage in 
new practices or interact with new structures within the new manufacturing plant. Once operators 
were hired, they went to the training center for 3-6 months and more than a million hours of 
training were given to the new recruits to prepare them for the profession of automobile 
manufacturing.  
MNE 6, in the consumer goods industry, faces challenges in the Moroccan market as a 
result of the large informal economy in which a large amount of counterfeit goods are sold. The 
informal economy is a significant regulatory constraint that has a negative impact on its 
businesses; the sale of counterfeit goods reduces its sales and renders its products less attractive 
for consumers. To fight against the prevalence of these fake products on the market, the company 
has been training customs officers in Morocco and Algeria by providing them with the tools to 
identify fake products, in partnership with these countries’ governments.  
 Corporate Social Responsibility and Other Forms of Societal Engagement   
The final type of institutional work identified in this research was corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). CSR strategies were treated as institutional work in this study because they 
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are strategically implemented by MNE subsidiaries to gain legitimacy within the institutional 
context. In addition, CSR strategies enable subsidiaries to build relationships with different 
stakeholders, which further serve to legitimize their presence in the local institutional context. For 
example, it was found that in many instances MNE subsidiaries work in partnership with the 
government and with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement their CSR 
initiatives. MNE subsidiaries ’ different social initiatives in Morocco include: donations of school 
supplies and computers to schools, subsidizing summer camps for the children of staff (MNE 2); 
initiating programs linked to road safety and the environment, promoting entrepreneurship among 
youth, providing children with backpacks and bicycles, supporting education initiatives and the 
installation of a water purification unit that provides clean drinking water in rural areas (MNE 9); 
supporting the integration of youth into the workforce and being a sponsor of Sidaction [Action 
for Aids] in Morocco and of agricultural cooperatives of women in the South of the country 
(MNE 1); support for educational programs in different cities and villages in Morocco, support 
for SOS Children’s Villages, an international NGO that supports Morocco’s vulnerable young 
population (MNE 3); bringing e-learning technology to remote villages in Morocco to assist the 
teachers there who have few supplies and materials in the schools where they teach  (MNE 4); 
painting schools, sponsoring an association that aids single mothers (MNE 6); providing 
associations with the tools and the training so they can use technology as an enabling factor in 
their organizations (MNE 5); and subsidizing after school classes to support the children of 
employees (MNE 8). These CSR programs are philanthropic in nature and are adapted to the 
institutional context. The Country Manager of MNE 3 stated: “… there should be an active social 
responsibility program to give back to the poor and needy or to the environment of this country.”  
It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive list of all the CSR programs that the MNE 
subsidiaries have launched in Morocco. In fact, most MNE subsidiaries have well-developed 
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CSR programs that they have been working on for a number of years and that are adapted to the 
local institutional setting. According to most respondents, the subsidiaries receive general CSR 
guidelines from headquarters that they adapt to the local context. If they perceive a specific local 
need then they can request additional funds from the parent company for the project.  
The study also found that MNE subsidiaries associate the authorities for some of their 
CSR projects. For example, MNE 6, in consumer goods, often uses sports themes in its marketing 
and CSR and collaborated with the Ministry of Youth and Sports to organize a football 
tournament for marginalized youth. “We involved the authorities because it was a constructive 
project for Moroccan society. They went into small villages to choose youth and build teams that 
would participate in the football tournament” (Human Resources Director). MNE 7 also 
collaborates with the authorities for CSR initiatives. Since the company specializes in automotive 
manufacturing, it has been collaborating with the authorities and the Ministry of Equipment to 
promote road security though the launch of road safety campaigns that target youth and 
professional drivers.   
In terms of CSR geared towards employees, the research found that MNE subsidiaries 
have programs to promote employee satisfaction. For example, in 2011, MNE 3, in the express 
logistics sector, was recognized by the CGEM, (an employer’s association), as one of the best 
employers in Morocco for its communications program, working conditions and proximity to 
management. Similarly, in 2014, MNE 5, in the computer software industry, was recognized by 
the CGEM as the best employer and was recognized for the professional development 
opportunities available to its employees. Another finding was that the MNE subsidiaries are 
increasingly looking to hire local individuals, even for high-level management positions. 
According to the Business Development Director of MNE 1, in the hotel industry, “it is a 
willingness of [MNE] to say, we are a responsible corporate citizen, we come to Morocco and we 
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have the responsibility to develop local talents.” MNE 3 is also increasingly hiring local 
individuals: “we believe that locals serve their markets better and therefore localization is 
becoming high in the agenda” (Country Manager). According to the respondent, in the past, the 
entire senior management team used to be composed of expatriates but now local individuals are 
filling these positions. Several MNE subsidiaries indicated that they are now able to hire local 
individuals because there is a growing population of highly educated persons that have studied 
abroad or locally and that can fulfill market needs.  
Relationship with key stakeholders  
MNE subsidiaries indicated that they create stakeholder matrices and that they have a 
strategy for stakeholder management. MNE 9, in the energy sector, identifies its most important 
stakeholders and monitors relationships with the latter throughout the year. Different departments 
within the organization manage different stakeholders. For example, the Country Director 
manages the relationships with the Ministry of Energy, while the Human Resources Director 
manages relationships with unions. The most pressing issues are tracked every trimester to 
anticipate possible issues and action plans are put in place to prevent potential crises.  
The findings indicate that MNE subsidiaries are pioneers in terms of CSR in Morocco and 
influence the CSR practices of local companies. For example, MNE 9 adheres to international 
health, safety, security and environment standards in its operations and requires that the standards 


















MNE 2 regulative:  
existing laws to 
penalize companies for 
delays in payments for 
services or products is 
ineffective 
“We were involved in many meetings 
with government officials to discuss 
application of the law. However, in 
practice, this law could not be 
applied” 
Lobbied the government 
to put in place measures 
that would lead to the 
application of the law 
(through its membership 
in the CGEM, an 
employer association)  
 
Advocacy 
MNE 3 regulative: 
existing regulation 
stipulates that 
companies in the 
express logistics sector 
must pay royalties to 
the National Post 
Office  
 
“At the moment we have no choice 
but to pay but we’ve been in 
discussions with the government and 
the head of the National Post Office 
who agrees with us… But the law 
needs to go through a certain 
process…” 
 
Lobbied the government 
to change the law  
Advocacy 
MNE 3 regulative: 
minimum value of 
declaration for 
packages is excessively 
low (adds red tape) 
  
“If the value of an item is less than 50 
Euros, you don’t need any documents 
with it. We are trying to increase that 
to 100 Euros or more” 
 
Lobbied the government 
to update regulation 
Advocacy 
MNE 10 regulative: 
existing law stipulates 
that percentage of 
profits must be 
reinvested for the first 
ten years of operation 
(for firms offering a 
public service) 
 
“..The way they were doing it was by 
having two [local] companies…These 
two companies are tied to the 
contract. MNE 10 is not a public 
service, so if it makes profit, it is 
entitled to take money out of the 
country” 
 
Ignored law  
MNE 2 cognitive: 
prevalence of Wasta 
practices  
“In Morocco, there are relationships 
that are man to man, if you don’t have 
the right contacts, it is difficult to get 
things moving... the emotional 
relations that develop are what gets 
things to move smoothly for the 
MNC” 
 
Conform: adapted to 
local institution  
Conform 
MNE 5 regulative: 
government proposal to 
limit access to the 
Internet  
“..we do lobbying, talk to people, 
explain to them the dangers of 
stopping innovation in our country, 




and political actors to 















MNE 1 regulative: 
length of time to obtain 
permits 
“To overcome this, we continue to do 
what we have to do… We know a lot 
of people… The Ministry of Tourism 
also implicates itself personally… So 
we have to engage in lobbying and to 
develop relationships with people at 
high levels” 
 
Lobbying to obtain 
permits more rapidly  
Advocacy 
MNE 1 regulative and 





“If there is a tender for a piece of land 
that becomes available, it is important 
to do some lobbying with the 
Ministry, so that they push for us to 
win the business…it is an explaining 
kind of lobbying, we don’t show up 
with a briefcase” 
 
Lobbying to obtain 
contracts 
Advocacy 
MNE 4 normative: 
Islamic practice  
“We have a program of adaptation of 
new employees…I explain that you 
should avoid scheduling meetings on 
Friday afternoons because people go 
to prayer…We ask expatriates to 
respect the month of Ramadan and 
avoid drinking coffee in front of 
others” 
 
Conform: adapted to 
local institutions  
 
MNE 4 cognitive: lack 
of understanding about 
technological services 
“We try to push everything that is 
technology. And for these types of 
services we need to explain our 
expertise…They don’t always see the 
benefits of some of the services. 







MNE 6 regulative: lack 
of regulation of 
informal economy 
“We fight against that [counterfeit 
goods] by hiring outside agencies. and 
training customs officers so they can 
identify fake products… authorities 
are very keen on this, we provide 





MNE 8 regulative: 
delays in getting 
authorizations  
“The public affairs department 
manages relationships with public 
authorities.. so we do a little lobbying 
and try to influence things but in a 
transparent and ethical way” 
 





The Impact of the Arab Spring on MNE subsidiaries   
The period during and following the Arab Spring events provided a rich setting to analyze 
the strategies of MNE subsidiaries as it was a period during which the existing social order was 
temporarily called into question. All companies indicated that the Arab Spring movement had an 
impact on their business operations in Morocco and in the other regions of the Arab world where 
they operate. The impact was felt by MNE subsidiaries at the level of business operations, 
processes, revenue, security and internal and external relationships. In terms of revenue, many 
companies with public sector clients lost contracts because the state budget was voted in with 
delay as a result of the political and government instability in 2011. Some MNE subsidiaries were 
impacted because the government changed priorities and began focusing more on basic 
necessities rather than investing in technology. The MNE subsidiary in the hotel industry 
experienced declining sales and revenue due to the political instability that resulted. Many of its 
international clients cancelled seminars they were supposed to have in Morocco (in the 
company’s hotels) and held them in other countries. The MNE in the express logistics industry 
was impacted because there was less trade conducted in North Africa and fewer investments 
being made by foreign investors, which meant that the flow of goods coming in and leaving 
Morocco declined. Many manufacturing contracts, for example, were moved to more stable 
regions.  
Internally, MNE subsidiaries are well prepared to manage institutional changes or crises 
internally. They have detailed business continuity plans that provide them with specific 
instructions on the course of action needed if there are emergencies at their factories or offices 
and that allow them to continue accessing important data and to work, even if it is remotely.  
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The government instability that resulted following the Arab Spring increased costs and 
greater challenges for MNE subsidiaries; however, they were able to alleviate some of the 
pressure through institutional work.  
Opportunities for Institutional Work 
This research demonstrates that MNE subsidiaries are constantly engaging in institutional 
work to adapt to or create a more favorable institutional environment, however, the institutional 
change brought about by the Arab Spring events provided some of these MNE subsidiaries  with 
more opportunities to engage in institutional work.  
The subsidiary of MNE 10, in environmental services, was the company that experienced 
the greatest amount of institutional pressure as a result of the Arab Spring. The company was 
directly targeted by the protestors who called for it to leave the country and accused it of charging 
excessively high prices for public utilities. In addition, the protestors accused it of not investing 
enough in infrastructure for water and electricity services in Morocco. The MNE’s relationship 
with the authorities was also strained - it lost its legitimacy during the Arab Spring and the 
authorities did not want to be associated with it. One of the strategies that the MNE employed to 
attenuate some of the pressures it experienced was to reassess its relationship with external actors 
and to use lobbying as a means to build a dialogue with its different constituents. The company’s 
objective was to address the negative attitudes towards it (normative perceptions), improve its 
reputation and gain legitimacy. Prior to the Arab Spring, the MNE engaged mainly in high level 
lobbying at the level of ministers to discuss contracts for projects. However, following the Arab 
Spring events and the protests that directly targeted it, the company began lobbying the 
government, civil society and other local actors to overcome institutional pressures. For example, 
before building a new pipeline in a street, the communications team started working with NGOs 
in the area and engaging in awareness raising activities regarding the need to renew the pipelines 
65 
 
and the benefits that it would bring to the neighborhood. According to Communications Director 
of MNE 10, in the past, the company would begin their projects without warning the residents, 
building animosity against the company. The Director noted: “Lobbying involves explaining to 
all involved parties – authorities, civil society, etc. And we are able to it today because we have 
partners within civil society and other local stakeholders. We have proved to them that we are 
their partners. Before we just made the changes and did not consult with any local stakeholders.” 
The institutional work of advocacy has enabled the MNE subsidiary to rebuild some of its 
external relationships following the Arab Spring.  
The MNE 10 subsidiary has also engaged in definitional institutional work as it created a 
new role within its subsidiary. In order to be successful in its lobbying efforts, including at the 
grassroots level, the company created a position for a Director of Branding and Reputation who 
would be solely in charge of managing the company’s relationships with NGOs and other local 
actors and to rebuild them. “Since we launched a grassroots strategy, we decided to work from 
the bottom up, and we needed someone with enough awareness and expertise, that knew the field, 
that would be capable of lobbying at different levels, speak to the poor, to the authorities, etc. So 
the person in charge does a lot of footwork” (Communications Director). The Director of 
Branding and Reputation monitors criticism against the company, including from NGOs who 
participated in the protests against the company during the Arab Spring. He asks informants to 
attend meetings of these NGOs on his behalf and to monitor any upcoming demonstrations 
against the company.   
The subsidiary of MNE 3, in the express logistics sector, also took advantage of the 
uncertain environment and used advocacy to advance its interests. The subsidiary indicated that 
the changes that took place following the Arab Spring provided it with an opportunity to 
influence regulations to be more effective. It took advantage of the government’s greater 
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willingness to improve business conditions in Morocco following the Arab Spring:  “So today, 
you can actually knock on their [government officials] doors, and somebody will answer. They 
will sit and listen. They’re beginning to see the bigger picture – making the Moroccan economy 
more competitive. Previously, they were all very suspicious about what is coming in, they still 
are, but they try to promote best practices” (Country Manager). One of the regulatory changes 
that the company succeeded in obtaining was a dedicated customs office in its new shipping hub 
in the Casablanca airport. This was revolutionary in Morocco, because up until then all the 
express and logistics companies shared the same customs offices that processed the shipments of 
all companies, slowing down the process for the company. Within its new shipping hub, the 
MNE provided customs officers with offices, training, and knowledge to be able to work 
efficiently at processing the shipments that it expedites throughout the world. 
The subsidiary of MNE 3 also worked in partnership with the Minister of Transport and 
other businesses to promote Morocco as a safe and stable place to invest in following the Arab 
Spring. They attended conferences and exhibitions in France, Spain, Italy and Portugal to market 
the country and to improve customer and investor confidence. The Country Manager of the MNE 
presented the strength of the logistics infrastructure in Morocco, while the Minister of Transport 
spoke about the stability of the country and aimed to reassure potential investors. They jointly 
marketed Morocco and spoke about the country’s stability, the strength of its infrastructure and 
the quality of its goods and services.  
CSR Strategies as Institutional Work  
The Arab Spring had an impact on societal-level institutions as it raised greater awareness 
on the existing social inequalities in Morocco and particularly on the youth unemployment issue. 
Young people between the ages of 15 and 29 make up 30 percent of the Moroccan population, 
yet 49 percent are neither in school nor in the workforce (World Bank, 2012). Many youth 
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participated in the Arab Spring events to voice their discontent concerning lack of opportunity in 
Morocco. In fact, the Arab Spring in Morocco signaled a greater democratic opening, as people 
were able to protest and voice their opinions, with less resistance from the regime as before. 
Furthermore, during the Arab Spring there were more questions about the way that companies 
were supposed to behave and their role in society and a concern for greater transparency and less 
corruption. According to the General Manager and Finance Director at MNE 2, companies were 
impacted by changes in normative conditions: “there is a greater awareness about social issues 
and about redistributing wealth. Companies do not want to have problems due to the great social 
inequalities and realize that wealth should be redistributed within society.” Although all MNE 
subsidiaries  surveyed had been working on CSR programs in Morocco for a couple of years, 
several respondents indicated that following the Arab Spring events, they increased their social 
responsibility programs or re-oriented them to better address the current societal problems. In 
fact, several MNE subsidiaries  specifically put in place CSR programs to address the socio-
economic issues brought to the fore following the Arab Spring. They participated in these CSR 
activities to maintain or gain legitimacy within their host environment in the eyes of various 
stakeholders: employees, the authorities, citizens and civil society. This research has shown that 
the Arab Spring gave rise to important corporate social responsibility trends, which include: 
 Support to national socio-economic challenges including employment and 
entrepreneurship 
 CSR That Aims to Maintain or Rebuild Reputation in MNE Local Environment 
 CSR to Anchor Organization in Local Environment 
 
Support to national socio-economic challenges including employment and entrepreneurship 
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 Following the Arab Spring, the subsidiary of MNE 5, in the computer software industry, 
re-oriented its CSR strategy to focus on youth employability. The company has been 
collaborating with the National Office of Vocational Training and Labor Promotion and has 
provided information technology certification training to more than 20,000 individuals, including 
the trainers who will train youth.  The company is also investing in youth startups and is currently 
accompanying young entrepreneurs for three years by giving them the tools, technology and the 
training that can help them launch successful IT startups. The company specifically implemented 
a CSR program that would address the needs of the population, and youth in particular: “…before 
the Arab Spring, a lot of CSR was geared towards the government, whereas now the CSR is 
geared towards the people” (Country Manager). In addition, as a response to the recognition of 
Berber languages by the new Moroccan constitution, the MNE introduced Amazighe [Berber] 
language on the operating systems that it sells.  
CSR That Aims to Maintain or Rebuild Reputation in MNE Institutional Environment  
The subsidiary of MNE 8, in the pharmaceutical sector, has been investing in corporate 
social responsibility actions that focus on the patient, the planet, employees and ethics since 
2010. As part of its CSR ethics dimension, since the Arab Spring, the company has taken specific 
measures within its organization to increase transparency in its practices. The company has 
established measures to decrease corrupt practices such as paying doctors or giving them material 
compensation such as electronic devices (ex. iPads) or trips. In addition, as it has a large 
relational network with the medical community and invites members of this community to 
conferences and seminars, the company has established a maximum threshold that can be spent 
per individual at these events to guard against unethical practices. The MNE has also put in place 
measures to prevent unethical practices within its processes. According to the Communications 
Director “the sources for corrupt practices are multiple in all sectors of activity [not just the 
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pharmaceutical industry] and we have put in place measures to guard against them.” These new 
measures have been taken following the Arab Spring and are in line with Morocco’s political will 
to curb corruption.  
To address accusations of not being sensitive to the economic realities of the population, 
change negative perceptions and build legitimacy, MNE 10, in environmental services, launched 
a CSR program specifically tailored to the segments of the population that could help improve its 
image within society. One of the major stakeholders the company targeted were poor working 
mothers in the north of the country, who have a lot of influence on their families in Moroccan 
society. The company collaborated with local NGOs to launch several initiatives aimed at helping 
women in the neighborhoods where it operates, including the creation of day cares for women 
with young children, embroidery classes for women to teach them new skills, and encouraged the 
creation of cooperatives. The MNE subsidiary and its partner NGOs also launched literacy 
classes for women, a health caravan, and cultural activities. The company engaged in these 
activities to be able to continue working in the neighborhoods that were protesting against its 
presence in Morocco, something that had become difficult and dangerous for the company to do 
following the Arab Spring protests (see case study in appendix). By supporting women that live 
in these neighborhoods, the company sought to improve its image and to appear as a good 
corporate citizen and regain legitimacy in the institutional environment.  
CSR to Anchor Organization in Local Environment 
Prior to its new CSR strategy, most of the social initiatives of MNE 10 were sustainable 
development projects in the South of Morocco launched by its CSR foundation in the Paris 
company headquarters. However, after the Arab Spring events during which people were 
protesting against its presence in the country, the company had to rethink its CSR strategy and 
decided to leverage CSR to become a more Moroccan and local company. It launched CSR 
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strategies that were adapted to the local institutional context. According to the Communications 
Director: “ We had to find a way to be local, not just follow the headquarter instructions… We 
had to show that we were a Moroccan company that is really in sync with the environment. So 
now our CSR programs are 100% local.” One strategy that the MNE employed was to begin 
inviting local communities to events, where the Moroccan flag was set up and the national 
anthem was played, practices that MNE did not engage in previously, as it had considered itself 
as a French and secular company. In addition, prior to supporting social causes such as literacy 
campaigns for women, the company ensured that it had the buy-in of Islamic religious leaders as 
to minimize the risk of offending the most conservative segments of society. Following the Arab 
Spring, the company capitalized on cultural and religious nuances to better implement itself and 
to gain legitimacy.  
Stakeholder relations 
Following the Arab Spring, some MNE subsidiaries had to reassess their main 
stakeholders and to manage their relationships with these constituents more effectively. As a 
company that offers environmental and public services, MNE 10, has many stakeholders to 
manage, including government actors (court of auditors, Ministry of Interior, municipal councils, 
etc.), customers, local and international NGO, the media and the public. The Arab Spring events 
strained many of its stakeholder relations and the company had to make a deliberate effort to 
initiate a dialogue with all of its stakeholders and to rebuild its legitimacy. Specifically, the 
company’s CSR initiatives, which it collaborated on with NGOs, helped it rebuild its relationship 
with customers and the public. The communities that benefited from the programs helped 
promote the company to the media and local government actors such as elected officials in 
municipal councils. The company gradually succeeded in rebuilding its legitimacy through CSR 
strategies, which facilitated interaction with all of the company’s stakeholders.  
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The MNE 3 subsidiary, in the express logistics sector, indicated that it had to build 
stronger relations with some of its key stakeholders, including the police and royal gendarmerie. 
Because it operates in the express and logistics industry, there are some important security risks 
for the company and the country. The company transports materials in aircrafts, which could 
present an opportunity to transport illegal weapons. Due to the political instability associated with 
the Arab Spring, the company cooperates even more with the police and works in partnership 
with them, and alerts them if there are suspicious occurrences. According to the Country 
Manager: “It has brought the partners closer together, from a security perspective and from a 
partnership perspective and has allowed further dialogue to be done.” 
The subsidiary of MNE 1, in the hotel industry, indicated that it had to make a concerted 
effort to build relationships with new government actors following the Arab Spring. According to 
the Business Development Director of the subsidiary, “With the Arab Spring, there was a 
reshuffling of cards, so we had to make greater efforts to rebuild trust, develop relations and 
explain that it is in the interest of the country to host a business like [MNE 1].” The company’s 
relationship with the unions were also impacted following the Arab Spring, as employees at a 
large hotel in Rabat, the capital, demanded better working conditions. The company addressed 
these challenges by building a dialogue and negotiating with the unions and addressing some of 
their grievances.  
CSR Strategies of MNE subsidiaries in Egypt and Tunisia Following the Arab Spring 
After interviewing the Country Manager of MNE 5, a global company that offers 
computer software and hardware, he suggested that I speak with the Country Managers of the 
Egyptian and Tunisian subsidiaries and provided me with their contact information. The 
subsidiaries in Egypt and Tunisia evolved in a very different institutional context than in 
Morocco and they faced greater pressure during the Arab Spring protests. In both Egypt and 
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Tunisia, the regimes that had been in power for decades were overthrown which had far-reaching 
consequences; local, as well international firms were deeply impacted by the government 
instability that ensued. After interviewing the country managers of the Egyptian and Tunisian 
subsidiaries, some interesting findings emerged pertaining to CSR strategies, which I include in 
the next section as well as in the appendix.  
Egyptian Subsidiary  
Following the Arab Spring, the Egyptian subsidiary developed a 3-year CSR strategy 
focusing on employability, which it identified as an important area to target in the current 
institutional environment. The subsidiary invested $5 million in kind and in cash in different 
areas to build the capacity of NGOs that specialize in the field of employability, and to strengthen 
an existing employability portal that supports Egyptians, including youth, recent graduates and 
women. The portal includes job postings, career advice and skills development modules. The 
company is also supporting an employability initiative that specifically targets women to provide 
them with more opportunities, either by finding work or becoming entrepreneurs. According to 
the respondent, in the Arab world, women do not have the same opportunities as men and this 
project has been launched to address this societal issue. This is an important example of an MNE 
working on an initiative that can influence an institution, in this case “the gender institution”. It is 
during times of uncertainty and change that MNE subsidiaries may have the greatest 
opportunities to influence and alter some practices or norms in society (Karam and Jamali, 2013). 
In terms of stakeholder relationships, following the Arab Spring events, the subsidiary 
strived to maintain positive relations with its external stakeholders including its customers, its 
partner ecosystem, which includes suppliers, distributors, solution providers, etc., the public and 
government and political actors. However, due to the changes in government actors, the company 
has needed to reintroduce its products and services and has faced some resistance due to the lack 
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of understanding about technological services. In order to show its value preposition to the 
authorities, the company worked through other key stakeholders. For example, to convey its 
value to the Ministry of Education, it reached out to teachers and provided them with software so 
that the Ministry of Education would perceive the company as valuable to one of its key 
stakeholders – teachers: “We worked with our stakeholders to present ourselves” (Country 
Manager.) The company also strengthened its relationships with the NGOs it was working with 
and leveraged them to deliver more relevant projects for the country.   
Tunisian Subsidiary  
The subsidiary in Tunisia experienced major pressure and legitimacy concerns during the 
Arab Spring because it had collaborated extensively with the previous regime and was accused of 
having been involved in corrupt practices. The company launched a CSR strategy to rebuild its 
reputation. It collaborated with the new government in place to demonstrate that it had not been 
involved in any corrupt or unethical practices. It also assessed the current challenges that Tunisia 
was facing and launched development programs to address unemployment, startup skills 
development, and entrepreneurship. It collaborated with NGOs, associations, government 
agencies, and the private sector to work in these areas. After implementing the CSR campaign, 
the company communicated about it using public relations and communications tools. This 
helped improve the image of the company and prompted the media and civil society to perceive 
the MNE in a more positive light. According to the Country Manager “Corporate Social 
Responsibility is a strong tool in moments of crisis – it shows that the company cares about its 
people in the specific local context, and that it cares about its partners.” The company’s initiatives 
have been successful “there have been communications improvements and the company has a 






Table 6: Examples of institutional pressures following the Arab Spring and corresponding 
responses 
 
Institutional Conditions Representative quote Response of subsidiary Institutional 
work 
 
MNE 1 regulative: 




“So when you have a person 
that comes out of nowhere 
after the Arab Spring and that 
you didn’t know, you have to 
invest a great deal in the 






MNE 10 normative: 
negative attitudes towards 
the company (for charging 
high prices, etc.) 
“We decided on a grassroots 
communications campaign, 
which is mainly socially 
oriented. We launched a CSR 
campaign… We decided to 
target the elements that we 
felt were the most intelligent 
for our strategy” 
 
Launched CSR 
campaign, made efforts 




MNE 5 cognitive: youth 
employability issues 
should be addressed by 
the private and public 
sectors 
“We had to focus on youth 
employment… we introduced 
certifications in Morocco at a 
very subsidized price.. we are 
also investing in youth.. So 
there was a refocusing…” 
 
Launched CSR activities CSR 
MNE 5 cognitive: 
recognition of different 
cultures and greater 
pluralism 
“We lobbied [parent 
company] so that inside 
Morocco you don’t see the 
separation of the Sahara on 
the map… We introduced 
Amazighe [Berber] language 
on [operating system]” 
 
Launched CSR activities CSR 
MNE 3 normative: Arab 
world perceived as no 
longer safe to invest in 
“Along with the new Minister 
of Transport and other 
businessmen, we tackled a 
few conferences exhibitions in 
France…and promoted 












        Many international management studies focus on the importance of institutions and 
the ways that institutions influence MNE activities. However, little research has looked at the 
ways that MNE subsidiaries influence institutions in their local business context. This study 
attempted to explore the ways MNE subsidiaries interact with local institutions and the strategies 
that they use to respond to institutions, in particular during periods of institutional upheaval. The 
research demonstrated that subsidiaries are constantly engaging in institutional work by 
interacting with the various constituents in their local environments including government and 
social actors, and that during and following the period of the Arab Spring, these companies had to 
reassess their role in the impacted countries and to respond in various ways to maintain or rebuild 
their legitimacy within this environment. Some MNE subsidiaries capitalized on the institutional 
change occurring to engage in advocacy and to bring about regulatory changes that were more 
favorable for business in Morocco. Others gave support to social causes, such as youth 
unemployment by promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. Therefore, the study suggests that 
institutions can be constraining for firms but that the latter can also actively engage in 
institutional work to bring about changes, improve their business environment and effect positive 
social change in the long-term. The study contributes to the research on the relationship between 
MNE subsidiaries and institutions and provides insights on some of the responses of MNE 
subsidiaries to institutional pressures or challenges in their environment.  
Institutional Work 
 The study identified three types of institutional work from Lawrence and Suddaby’s 
taxonomy that MNE subsidiaries engage in: ‘advocacy’, ‘defining’, and ‘educating’; the 
institutional work is aimed at facilitating MNE subsidiaries’ business operations in Morocco by 
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helping them adapt to the challenges or constraints in the institutional environment, allowing 
them to maintain or gain legitimacy, or giving them access to resources and new opportunities. 
The research found that advocacy was the type of institutional work that was most often 
employed by MNEs and involved mobilizing the support of key political or government actors. In 
fact, the MNE subsidiaries maintained a collaborative relationship with the authorities to 
overcome regulative constraints such as administrative slowness and to be able to engage 
successfully in advocacy when they needed to advance their projects. The subsidiaries are 
effective at engaging in this type of institutional work because they have adapted their strategies 
to the local institutional context; the effort that they exert to change some aspects of their 
institutional environments is done locally, by interacting with local actors.  Therefore, although 
the MNE subsidiaries all originated from developed countries and are international in their 
processes and structures, the research found that they have adapted and localized many of their 
practices, which helps them navigate within the institutional environment, manipulate and 
influence it. MNEs negotiate with actors within their environments because they need legitimacy 
and resources from the external environment; at the same time, however, they provide 
technology, capital, and employment and can contribute to economic development in the long 
run. Following the Arab Spring, when many government and political actors were replaced, some 
MNE subsidiaries had to make a deliberate effort to develop ties with the new authorities so as to 
be able to collaborate with them and engage in lobbying in the future.  
CSR as Institutional Work  
The Arab Spring events caused government instability and changed certain societal 
norms, including expectations concerning the role of business in society and brought to light the 
important constraints that young people in the Middle East and North Africa face such as lack of 
opportunity and high unemployment rates. The study found that MNE subsidiaries responded to 
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societal pressures by adopting more CSR programs, and programs that specifically addressed the 
needs of young people to support them in gaining the skills and abilities to promote their 
employability.  Therefore, CSR is a type of institutional work that actors use to gain legitimacy 
by appearing as more responsible economic actors.   
         MNE subsidiaries’ CSR projects are aimed at giving back to the local community while 
gaining legitimacy from both internal and external stakeholders in their environments; therefore 
their projects are adapted do the local environment. In fact, the research found that many of the 
CSR initiatives were micro-projects tailored to the needs of small and local communities. This is 
consistent with previous research that argues that CSR in developing countries tends to be less 
formalized and more philanthropic in nature (Amaeshi et. 2006; Visser, 2008). In addition, our 
study confirms Jamali’s (2009) and Visser’s (2008) assertion that CSR in this part of the world is 
related to deeply engrained cultural and religious values and primarily targets local communities. 
These findings are important because MNE subsidiaries can use CSR strategies to become more 
local and to capitalize on the religious and cultural nuances in their institutional context to gain 
greater legitimacy. In fact, several companies following the Arab Spring used CSR strategically 
to alleviate institutional pressures, such as negative perceptions towards Western companies.  
           MNE subsidiaries can influence institutions in the societies in which they operate through 
their strategies, including CSR. For example, many of the MNE subsidiaries in the information 
technology sector launched training programs on technology and supported the activities of youth 
start-ups to encourage innovation in the Middle East. Since the situation in the Middle East was 
highly unstable following the Arab Spring, these companies wanted to promote entrepreneurship 
and self-employment as a viable career option for youth. Many MNEs also launched CSR 
programs to support women or gave support to organizations that provide training and mentoring 
to women to encourage them to work and to reduce the gender gap. These examples show that 
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MNE subsidiaries can bring about positive social change and influence societal institutions 
through their CSR strategies. At the same time, however, MNE subsidiaries are cautious about 
the social causes they support because they do not want to be perceived as promulgating Western 
values or ideologies in the countries in which they operate. For example, the subsidiary of MNE 
10 wanted to launch several micro-projects that specifically addressed the needs of poor working 
mothers in Morocco to increase its legitimacy in the environment. One of the initiatives that it 
supported was a literacy campaign for women who could not read or write. Before launching the 
campaign, the subsidiary secured the buy-in of Islamic religious leaders to make sure that its 
initiatives were not deemed inappropriate within the environment. Therefore, the study suggests 
that MNE subsidiaries need to tread carefully when attempting to shape local institutions, 
especially institutions such as gender which are sensitive and are associated with moral 
foundations that can be highly immutable. MNE subsidiaries have to perform a balancing act of 
respecting the norms and cultural specificities within a society to gain legitimacy and of 
capitalizing on the changes occurring to bring about positive social change.  
The study also suggests that MNE subsidiaries can influence the business practices of 
local firms. For example, local firms increasingly understand the role of CSR projects and the 
impact it can have in garnering support from society in general and in raising the morale of 
employees. Subsidiaries also influence local firms, especially their suppliers, when they 
encourage them to obtain certifications or to have better personnel practices employees including 
respecting their employees and giving them benefits.    
           As mentioned above, the research suggests that MNE subsidiaries adapt their strategies to 
the local environment and at the same time negotiate with actors in the environment and 
influence local business practices. An additional insight is that while adapting their strategies to 
the local environment, MNE subsidiaries also change internally. For example, the subsidiaries are 
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increasingly hiring local individuals, including at high levels in the organization because the 
latter can more effectively navigate the institutional environment as a result of their 
understanding of cultural nuances. Other internal changes include creating new professional roles 
in the organization to fulfill a function that is particular to the country or environment in which 
the subsidiary operates. These findings are significant because they suggest that as subsidiaries 
become increasingly local, their practices will gradually diverge from those of their parent 
companies and they may gain more autonomy from them.    
MNE Agency 
This study contributes to the discussion that focuses on the relationship between 
institutions and MNE subsidiaries and demonstrates the ways that proactive MNE subsidiary 
managers interact with local business institutions and influence them. Institutional research in the 
past few decades has tended to focus on the taken-for-granted characteristics of organizational 
environments and on the ways the structure of institutions dictate the behavior of firms while 
underestimating the roles of agency or strategic responses in organizations (Beckert, 1999). 
Drawing from the concept of institutional work, this study sought to contribute to the more recent 
institutional research that has demonstrated that organizations do have strategic choice. On the 
one hand, institutions exert pressure on MNE subsidiaries and constrain some of their actions, but 
on the other hand, organizations have the ability to put pressure and influence regulatory, 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutions. The extent to which MNE subsidiaries will use 
strategic action to effect change to these institutions depends on the outcome that they are seeking 
to achieve. For example, the study found that MNE subsidiaries responded strategically to 
normative and cognitive demands by conforming to them, as it was advantageous for them. On 
the other hand, they manipulated certain regulatory pressures in order to advance their interests. 
In fact, the MNE subsidiaries have proactive subsidiary managers who engage with complex 
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local institutions and purposefully attempt to shape them. Thus, institutions are not just 
constraints but can provide unique opportunities for firms. For example, the research showed that 
MNE subsidiaries leveraged host country institutions such as professional organizations to defend 
or promote their interests within the Moroccan business environment; MNE subsidiaries work 
actively around institutions as opposed to passively accepting them.  
The study also contributes to the research on institutional plurality by outlining some 
cases where MNE subsidiaries are faced with complexity stemming from the fact that they must 
respond to several environments, including their home and host environments. Legitimacy 
pressures on subsidiaries are strong and complex (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). It is difficult to 
reconcile pressure from parent and external host country institutional environment. The study 
finds that while MNE subsidiaries are accountable to the parent organization, they also have 
agency in responding to the local institutional environment in which they exist.  
Limitations  
The study, which aimed to explore instances of institutional work, has several limitations. 
First, it makes generalizations about strategic responses based on only 10 MNE subsidiaries 
operating in Morocco. Second, some of the MNE subsidiaries in the sample are small while 
others are large; smaller subsidiaries are less likely to interact with actors in the institutional 
environment and to be dependent on them for resources. Another important difference between 
the MNE subsidiaries is that some have been operating in Morocco for decades while others have 
been in Morocco for only a few years; the longer a subsidiary has been in Morocco, the more 
likely it has become local in its practices and functioning. Adapting to the local environment 
helps promote the survival and success of MNE subsidiaries. In addition, MNEs that have 
international experience in many different institutional contexts can adapt more effectively than 
those with less experience. Finally, some MNE subsidiaries experience a greater amount of 
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institutional pressure as a result of industry regulations or standards or a fluctuating demand for 
the services that they provide, while others less so. Therefore, making comparisons across these 
different companies is considered a weakness of this study and could be improved by having a 
larger sample size. Another limitation of the study is that it does not capture the full complexity 
of the MNE subsidiary or the parent company. For example, the individuals interviewed may not 
have all the information regarding some of the strategies of the company. One way the research 
attempted to overcome this limitation was to conduct additional research by collecting archival 
data. However, even by employing this strategy, MNE subsidiaries are large entities with 
interrelated operations and strategies and capturing their full complexity in a single study is not 
an easy task to accomplish.  
82 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
An enduring debate in the international management literature has centered on the 
question of MNE subsidiaries’ autonomy from their parent companies and how much they need 
to adapt to the institutional environment to survive. Research in the past gave less importance to 
the pressures exerted on subsidiaries from local institutions, and focused more on pressures 
stemming from subsidiaries’ headquarters. Today, there is an increasing amount of scholarly 
literature suggesting that subsidiaries localize the practices that are critical to their success while 
recognizing that MNE headquarters also set institutional pressure. This study’s findings are 
consistent with this research and found that MNE subsidiaries in Morocco adapt their strategies 
and actively engage with local actors in their environment to influence practices or institutions to 
be more favorable. Following the Arab Spring, many MNE subsidiaries experienced greater 
institutional pressure and capitalized on the changes that took place to advocate for changes that 
were beneficial to their operations in Morocco. In addition, many subsidiaries increased their 
involvement in social causes that increased their legitimacy within the environment and 
contributed to positive social change.   
 The primary contribution of this research was to provide examples of MNE agency 
through institutional work and to show that firms have a wide range of actions at their disposal to 
influence institutions or practices. Suggestions for future research include conducting a 
longitudinal study to investigate how MNE subsidiaries influence specific local institutions over 
the long term. For example, the study found that MNE subsidiaries  in Morocco have well-
established CSR programs; it would be worthwhile to explore whether MNE subsidiaries ’ CSR 
practices or international environment standards are becoming institutionalized and adopted by 
local firms. Such a study would also allow researchers to gauge the effects of isomorphism on 
local firms.  Another suggestion for future research would be to conduct an in-depth study on the 
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process that MNE subsidiaries use to devise their CSR strategies and to investigate the amount of 
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Case Studies  
 
Multinational enterprises can influence the institutions within their host environments 
through important innovations such as the introduction of new technologies or processes, which 
are highly visible and dramatic but also through day-to-day mundane actions over the long-term 
that take a long time to be visible such as lobbying to change regulations or building relationships 
with local partners to acquire resources or build legitimacy in the local environment.  
Case studies were developed to complement the interview data collected and to 
demonstrate the ways in which MNE subsidiaries employ strategic responses to the institutions 
that permeate their institutional environments. The case studies have been compiled from both 
interview data and information drawn from online articles and company websites and highlight 
the ways in which the subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in Morocco have influenced local 
institutions. During the Arab Spring, which resulted in institutional change, some of the MNE 
subsidiaries were able to capitalize on the transition occurring to bring about changes leading to 
an improvement in their business environments.   
The case studies provide a brief overview of the MNE subsidiaries historical presence in 
Morocco (or Egypt and Tunisia for the two MNE subsidiaries in those countries), as well as the 
ways in which the MNE subsidiaries engage in institutional work to adapt to some of the 
constraints that they face. In addition, the individual case studies demonstrate the ways in which 
some MNE subsidiaries in the study were able to influence their institutional environment during 








Global MNE Moroccan subsidiary  
 
Industry: Hospitality and Tourism 
Company size: 170,000 employees 
International presence: Present in 92 countries 
2014 revenue: $6.141 billion US 
Headquarter location: France 
Founded in: 1967 
 
 
Company size:  3500 employees 
Organizational age: 1993 
Ownership: Joint Venture  
 
 
 Company Background   
 
MNE 1 is a French global firm in the hospitality and tourism industry with business 
operations in Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The company’s presence in 
Morocco dates back to 1993 when it took over the management contracts of two holiday villages in 
the south of the country. To reinforce its presence in Morocco, in 1996, the company signed a 
convention with the Moroccan government, and invested 100 million dollars to build 14 new hotel 
projects. The establishment of the MNE was an asset for the tourism sector because it attracted other 
foreign investors in the hotel and tourism industry. Since its establishment in Morocco, the company 
has built several hotels ranging from 2-star hotels to luxury establishments. 
Institutional Environment   
 
As it increased its involvement in the country in the 1990s, the company experienced some 
major constraints relating to the acquisition of land. The first issue was the high cost of acquiring land 
to build its hotel projects. In many instances in Morocco, international investors are asked to pay for 
land more than 10% of the project value. The second constraint that the company faced was related to 
the complicated administrative procedures to make land acquisitions as a foreign entity. To overcome 
these constraints in the Moroccan business environment, the MNE partnered with a group of 
Moroccan institutions that included banks and insurance companies to create an investment company, 
which would allow it to develop its hotels in Morocco more easily. Both the company and the 
institutional partners have invested financially in the company’s projects. The company is the major 
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shareholder with 34 percent of the shares of the investment company. According to the respondent, 
the company’s Business Development Director: “We have a particular kind of business development 
and this is what has allowed us to develop more rapidly in Morocco than in other countries in the 
region.” The partnership has not only enabled the company to invest in many different projects as a 
result of the financial support from its institutional partners, but it has also allowed it to leverage and 
use the institutional partners’ contacts and resources to obtain authorizations for projects more easily 
and rapidly than if it had been operating on its own in the market.   
In fact, one of the biggest constraints that the company faces in Morocco to conduct business 
is the length of time it takes to obtain authorizations for projects. The company engages in lobbying 
and negotiation to obtain approvals and authorizations. For example, in 1999, the company needed to 
obtain approval from the municipal council in Casablanca for a large-scale hotel and business 
complex that was going to be built on part of the municipality’s property. Initially, the company and 
the municipal council did not agree on the conditions of the project (including the sale price of the 
land) and it was only following difficult negotiations that lasted 18 months that the company and the 
municipal council were able to reach an agreement. The company solicited the help of key 
government actors to support in its lobbying efforts.  
The MNE subsidiary is also a member of professional associations including la Confédération 
Générale des Entreprises au Maroc (CGEM), the General Confederation of Companies in Morocco. 
The CGEM helps the company build relationships with local actors and is a source of lobbying to 
change laws or legislation. For example, through the CGEM, the company is seeking to change a law 
in Morocco that grants fiscal advantages only to large-scale projects.  The company is actively 
lobbying the government to lower the minimum investment amount from 200 million to 100 million 
Dirham to be eligible for fiscal advantages.  
The company also collaborates with other companies in the industry. In 2010, the subsidiary 
and other companies in the industry created l’Association Nationale des Investisseurs Touristique, the 
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National Association of Tourism Investors. This association allows investors to develop relationships 
with local actors and to lobby the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Tourism and to influence regulations and laws.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring 
The institutional instability that was caused by the Arab Spring events in Morocco had a 
financial impact on the MNE in Morocco. There was a marked decline in sales from January 2011 to 
April 2011 as many of the company’s clients, many of whom are international companies, opted to 
hold their seminars in hotels in other regions. The company responded by communicating with its 
different stakeholders including its customers to reassure them of the safety and stability of the 
country.  
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
The company was also impacted by the government instability that resulted following the 
protests. The company has been operating in Morocco since 1993 and has built a strong relationship 
with the authorities: “we develop relationships with the different administrations and ministries to be 
able to develop our business and continue operating in the host country” (Business Development 
Director). In order to conduct business in Morocco, the company has been developing relationships 
with local actors and engaging in lobbying to advance its interests. Thus, in the context of the post-
Arab Spring, during which many institutional changes took place, including new government officials 
coming to power, the company had to build ties with new actors.  
The company also had to manage some of its relationship with societal actors. The Arab 
Spring brought to the forefront the great social inequalities that exist in the Middle East and created 
an environment where individuals felt freer to challenge the existing social order. According to the 
respondent “there was a small impact on the group’s relationships with the unions.” As a result of the 
events, employees were more vocal about their rights. At one of the company’s hotels in Rabat, the 
employees sent a letter to hotel management, to the delegation of Labor and to the governor of the 
96 
 
Rabat region to request an improvement in their employment conditions.  The company responded to 
some of the requests of the employees because it strives to maintain social harmony within its hotels 
and an ongoing dialogue with all of its partners. The respondent noted the importance of maintaining 
a good relationship with its employees: “We have to manage these issues because if there is a two-
day strike at one of our hotels then our sales will decline. Clients won’t stay at the hotel, they will be 
unhappy and won’t return, and our brand image will be negatively impacted.”  
This case illustrates the ways in which the company strives to overcome institutional 
constraints by developing strategic relationships with local political and government actors and by 
engaging in lobbying and discussions with these same actors to establish and maintain its projects in 






Global MNE  Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Electrical Industrial Services 
Company size: 22,000 employees 
International presence: presence in 30 countries 
2014 Revenue: $43.58 billion US 
Headquarter location: Saint-Denis, France 
Founded in: 1913  
 
 
Company size:  2500 employees 
Organizational age: 1946 





MNE 2 is a French company with operations in more than 30 countries including France, 
Brazil, Indonesia and several countries in the Middle East and Africa.  The company offers 
technological services in the fields of electricity, information technology and communication, 
climatic and thermal engineering, and mechanical processing. In Morocco, the company’s main 
activities involve building infrastructure and providing high voltage electricity across the country on 
behalf of l’Office National d’Eléctricité (ONE), The National Electricity Office and l’Office Cherifien 
des Phosphates (OCP), The National Phosphates Office. The Moroccan subsidiary also provides 
services in renewable energy, transport, telecommunications, and water and waste treatment. It has 
been operating in Morocco since 1946. As a result of its long experience in Morocco, it has 
developed a privileged relationship with the authorities. It shares its knowledge and experience with 
the ONE and OCP and provides these organizations with advice on projects.  
Institutional Environment  
 
The main challenges that the company faces in operating in Morocco are obtaining permits or 
administrative forms from government administrations due to the complicated and inefficient 
bureaucracy. In addition, acquiring permits can be subject to preferential treatment and can involve 
petty corruption. In order to obtain authorizations or to legalize a form, the company conforms to the 
institutional environment and pays small sums to government officials. The company also strives to 
overcome administrative constraints by leveraging the connections that it has developed through its 
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long experience in Morocco. It has built relationships with government officials at the national level 
(ex. Ministry of Energy) and at the local government level (ex. municipalities).   
 The company also collaborates with industry associations to advance its interests. For 
example, it is a member of La Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), an 
employer’s association and of la Fédération Nationale de L’Électricité, de l’Électronique et des 
Énergies Renouvelables (FENELEC). These associations act as information brokers and lobbyists for 
firms. As a member of the CGEM workgroup committee, the MNE subsidiary gives its opinions on 
legislation or tax proposals made by the government. For example, after holding discussions with the 
different members, the CGEM met with the authorities and criticized certain provisions in the 
Finance Bill of 2013, which did not meet business expectations, including the creation of new taxes 
for companies in the energy sector. The MNE subsidiary also leverages the FENELEC to lobby the 
government for regulations. Therefore, working with professional organizations opens up doors to 
push company agendas more easily than if the company worked on its own.  
Another challenge that the company experiences in the Moroccan market is the prevalence of 
counterfeit electrical appliances and equipment. The company cooperates with other companies in the 
industry, with customs, and with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and New Technologies to fight 
against the import of counterfeit electrical equipment.   
The Impact of the Arab Spring  
The company was impacted by the institutional change that followed the Arab Spring events.  
As a result of the changes in government, the state budget was voted in with a lot of delay and many 
of the company’s contracts were delayed or cancelled. The second issue that the company 
experienced were greater delays in payment from its public clients such as the ONE and the OCP; the 
change in government actors aggravated the delays. 
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
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The company responded to the instability by striving to build relationships with new 
government actors that could support it in its business development efforts in Morocco. In terms of 
delays in payment, the company has been lobbying the authorities to impose penalties for delays in 





Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Express Logistics 
Company size: 480,000 employees 
International presence: Operates in 220 countries 
2014 revenue: $63.6 million US 
Headquarter location: Bonn, Germany 
Founded in: 1969 
 
 
Company size: 300 employees 
Organizational age: 1987 
Ownership: Wholly-owned subsidiary  
 
 
Company Background  
MNE 3 is a logistics company that provides international express mail services. The company 
has been operating in Morocco since 1987 where it provides express mail, and freight logistics 
services. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of the multinational, which is headquartered in Bonn, 
Germany. The company has about 300 employees in Morocco and is a market leader with 57% share 
of the market.   
Institutional Environment   
When the MNE opened an office in Morocco in 1987, it signed an agreement with l’Office 
Nationale des Postes et Télécommunications (ONPT), National Posts and Telecommunications 
Board, which had a monopoly on express post. Since the 1987 agreement with the ONPT, the 
company has been paying a monthly fee in exchange for operating in the express post industry. 
According to the respondent, the Country Manager of the MNE, the company has been working to 
revise the law, as it is outdated: “The Post has diversified and set up its own express products and it 
longer makes sense for [the MNE] to pay royalties.” The company has been calling for meetings to be 
held between the President of the Post and the company to revise the agreement. However, the law 
needs to go through a certain process and there are many other law revisions that are given bigger 
priorities.  
The company faces additional regulative constraints including inefficient customs clearance 
procedures and slow processing of its goods by customs officers. In partnership with the government, 
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the MNE has been providing training to customs officers to help them become more efficient; the 
company brings best-developed practices from other countries, such as the United Arab Emirates to 
train customs officials to promote faster clearance.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring  
The Arab Spring had a financial impact on the MNE as fewer companies were shipping their 
products from and to Morocco. Morocco is an outsourcing hub, companies in different industries 
including textile and automotive manufacture their products in Morocco and export them to other 
countries. As a result of the turbulent events in the region, many of the subsidiary’s contracts were 
cancelled as companies decided to do business in other regions than the Middle East and North 
Africa. “The perception was that North Africa (including Morocco) was a risky region to do business 
in. It reduced the possibilities for foreign direct investment and there was a decrease of trade taking 
place between North African countries” (Country Manager). 
The events did not have an impact on the company’s relationship with the authorities. 
However, the company is working more closely with the authorities for security purposes. The 
company brings aircrafts that are full of materials and therefore cooperates with customs, with the 
police and the royal gendarmerie to make sure that the shipments don’t present any security risks.  
Opportunities for Institutional Work   
The company responded to the events by working to improve customer confidence. Along 
with the Moroccan Minister of Transport and Equipment and other businessmen, the company 
country manager attended conferences and exhibitions in France, Spain, Italy and Portugal to promote 
Morocco as a safe place to invest in. The company explained that Morocco had an effective logistics 
infrastructure, and that the company could deliver goods, safely and quickly. The Minister of 
Transport spoke about politics, to reassure potential investors that the situation in Morocco was 




Following the Arab Spring, the company also seized the opportunity of the uncertain 
environment to lobby the authorities to advance its interests. It capitalized on the government’s 
greater willingness to improve business conditions in Morocco to lobby it to have dedicated customs 
officers working exclusively for the MNE in its regional hub. This represents the first time that a 
company has in-house customs solely processing its shipments.  Prior to this agreement, the company 
had to prepare files and send them to the customs officials who also worked on the files of other 





Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Telecommunications 
Company size: 118,706 employees 
International presence: Offices in 180 countries 
2014 revenue: $27.74 billion 
Headquarter location: Stockholm, Sweden 
Founded in: 1876 
 
 
Company size: 200 employees 
Organizational age: 1984 




Company Background  
 
MNE 4 is a multinational enterprise that provides communications technology and services to 
network operators in more than 180 countries. The company has been active in Morocco since 1984 
when it signed its first contract with the National Posts and Telecom Board (ONPT) to provide 
telephone fixed-line infrastructure. Several contracts followed in 1986, 1989 and 1990 and 1993; 
through these projects, MNE 4 has provided fixed-line infrastructure that cover a large of the part of 
the Moroccan territory.  Following the deregulation in the telecommunication industry in 1997, the 
ONPT was split into Maroc Telecom and Postes Maroc and an independent regulatory body, the 
National Telecommunication Regulatory Agency (ANRT) was created. This opened the door for 
major investments by foreign firms in the telecommunications industry including MNE 4 who 
became a supplier of GSM network infrastructure to Maroc Telecom, the incumbent telephone 
operator. In 2000, MNE 4 completed the GSM network infrastructure for Meditel, the second 
operator. 
Institutional Context  
Similarly to local firms and other MNE subsidiaries in Morocco, the company faces some 
constraints related to bureaucracy and administrative slowness. For example, when it was building the 
second GSM network in Morocco, it had difficulty accessing some of the sites on which were going 
to be installed the features of the network due to the multiple stakeholders involved in obtaining 
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authorizations (municipalities, urban agencies, and mouqaddems (representatives of neighborhoods). 
The company was able to receive the authorizations after soliciting the Ministry of Interior who 
facilitated the process by intervening on behalf of the company.  
Another challenge that the subsidiary faces is important delays in payment from its clients in 
the public sector, including government administrations and ministries. The company works to 
accelerate payments for services it has offered by being in contact with the organizations’ finance 
departments and by inquiring about the delays.  
As a technology company, the subsidiary works with its different stakeholders including 
ANRT (the telecommunications regulatory agency), telephone operators, the government, NGOs and 
citizens to promote the use of technology. However, it faces resistance because many of its 
stakeholders lack the technological knowledge to understand some of the company’s products and 
services. The company responds to these cognitive pressures by actively interacting with operators 
and other partners to provide them information on new features or services and invites them to 
business training sessions to enable them to acquire the new skills necessary to integrate new 
technologies. For example, the company has been lobbying the Ministry of Transport to introduce a 
service that would enable individuals to pay for highway tolls by phone - a service that already exists 
in other countries - and has been organizing meetings to explain this service to representatives of the 
Ministry of Transport.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring  
In Morocco, the government instability that followed the Arab Spring protests had little 
impact on the company’s operations. However, in the other Middle Eastern countries where the 
company has operations, “there was an impact at the level of the business, at the level of processes, 
how to adapt the processes and on the morale of the employees” (Human Resources Director). The 
company also experienced financial losses because clients stopped making investments in 
telecommunications services. The new governments that came to office in Egypt and Tunisia did not 
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have the necessary budgets to invest in telecommunications and did not view these services as a 
priority.  
 The company also experienced some administrative difficulties as a result of the instability in 
Egypt and Tunisia: “There was a change in government, which meant there was no more governing 
and no more political leaders. To obtain papers it was difficult” (Human Resources Director). In 
addition, government officials were often replaced and the company had to start or submit the same 
files several time to ensure that they were completed.  Although it was a difficult and unstable period 
for the company, it maintained its business operations and focused on optimizing the networks and 
making them function under high traffic loads: “we had more requests to stabilize the networks in 
Egypt and Libya [as people were communicating more during this period]. And this was more work 
for us but it didn’t translate into more revenue. With everything that was happening, we couldn’t ask 
to be compensated for the extra efforts. That was a challenge” (Human Resources Director). 
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
 Social media and mobile communications played a major role during the Arab Spring events. 
The protesters used social media platforms and mobile technology as tools to organize protests, stay 
connected and share information about the events. The MNE acknowledges this trend in its 2011 
corporate social responsibility report: “the tide of mass protests that swept through the Middle East in 
early 2011, and became known as the Arab Spring, emphasized the role of modern information 
communication technology (ICT) and digital media to spurt democracy.” At the same time, media 
reports criticized technology companies including MNE 4 for providing Middle Eastern regimes (the 
same regimes that people were denouncing during the protests) with surveillance technology to 
monitor their citizens. The technology included tools to monitor the information that users were 
accessing online or to block access to websites. MNE 4 used CSR tools to respond to the media 
reports and maintain its legitimacy. It stated in its 2011 corporate social responsibility report that it 
was committed to respecting human rights throughout its business operations. It also stated that it had 
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been holding meetings with its different stakeholders including investors, governments, non-
governmental organizations and international organizations to discuss ICT and human rights. In 
addition, it has adopted the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which 
were published in 2011 and has updated company policy and governance framework to reflect this 
commitment (2011 Corporate Social Responsibility Report). The MNE is also calling for the 
development of clearer guidelines for telecom companies that would guide them in promoting the use 
of information and communications technology to uphold human rights and to ensure that the 
technology is not misused. It has been participating in discussions with other companies, 
governments and civil society to discuss this issue and is calling for a coordinated effort to define 







Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Computer software and hardware 
Company size: 128,000 employees 
International presence: Offices in 100 countries 
2013 revenue: $86.83 billion 
Headquarter location: Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Founded in: 1975 
 
 
Company size: 60 employees 
Organizational age: 1984 
Ownership: Wholly-owned subsidiary 
 
 
Company Background  
MNE 5 is an American multinational that develops, manufactures, licenses and sells computer 
software, consumer electronics and personal computers and services; it was founded in 1975 and 
today operates in more than 140 countries. The company has been active in North Africa since 1993 
and has offices in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The company has been operating in 
Morocco since 1993 and the Moroccan office is the headquarters for North and West Africa.  The 
Moroccan subsidiary employs approximately 60 people.  
Institutional Environment  
 
The MNE works with public and private institutions, small and medium enterprises and other 
actors in the national economy to provide them with information technology and training to use its 
products and services. The company is confronted with challenges in its institutional environment 
related to an inefficient bureaucracy and corrupt practices, however according to the respondent “we 
follow compliance rules that are very strict and we have work perimeters that help us do our work and 
protect us” (Country Manager). The company also has concerns about the government limiting access 
to the Internet, which would deter innovation and technological advancement. The company lobbies 
the government and engages in discussions with Ministers to warn them of the harm that would be 
caused in terms of innovation and business creation if the government were to limit the use of the 
Internet.  
Impact of the Arab Spring  
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As a result of the government instability that followed the Arab Spring events, some of the 
company’s contracts with the government were stalled; for a period of time there was no government 
in office, which meant that contracts could not be signed. There were also government budget cuts 
and several of the company’s contracts were canceled.  
Opportunity for Institutional Work 
The company implemented several measures to accompany the societal-level changes that 
took place following the Arab Spring. For example, one of the demands to the government from 
protestors was the recognition of the Amazigh (Berber) language and culture. The new constitution 
recognized the Amazigh language as an official language in Morocco and the MNE subsidiary 
introduced the language in its operating system to accompany this national reform.  
The protests, led by youth, brought to the forefront the obstacles that youth face including 
limited work opportunities and lack of education and skills. To contribute to a solution to these issues, 
in September 2011, the company decided to reorient its national strategy to focus on youth 
employability. The company signed a convention with L’Office de la Formation Professionelle et de 
la Promotion du Travail, The Office of Professional Training and Labor Promotion to train 20,000 
individuals in the company’s software, information technology, the administration of networks, and 
in customer relationship management systems. The company invests in training professors who in 
turn conduct the training of the youth. The company also started supporting youth startups by 
providing young people with tools, technology and the training that will help them succeed in their 
entrepreneurial activities. “We have been engaging in CSR since 1998. For example, we did a lot of 
training for the unemployed. But before the Arab Spring, a lot of the CSR was geared towards the 





Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Consumer goods 
Company size: 118,000 employees 
International presence: Offices in 70 countries 
2013 revenue: $83.06 billion 
Headquarter location: Cincinnati, Ohio  
Founded in: 1837 
 
 
Company size: 210 employees 
Organizational age: 1958 
Ownership: Wholly owned subsidiary  
 
 
Company Background  
 
MNE 6 is an American multinational with a history dating back to 1837. The company 
commercializes consumer products including detergents, hygiene and cleaning products and has 
operations in approximately 80 countries in North America, Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East. The company has been in the Moroccan market since 1958 and operates two 
factories where its products are manufactured. It also imports many of its consumer goods that cannot 
be produced locally.   
Institutional Environment   
 
 One of the main challenges for the company in terms of doing business in Morocco is 
administrative slowness. For instance, to import its consumer goods from the United States or other 
locations, there is a large amount of administrative work required (especially for the import of new 
products) and obtaining authorizations can be a lengthy and complicated process. To facilitate the 
process, the company has put in place a department that manages the registration of new products and 
obtaining authorizations. This department regularly meets different ministries to present to them the 
company’s products and some of the issues that it encounters while doing business. The company 
works to accelerate processes by being informed of administrative procedures and by leveraging 
contacts. According to the respondent: “To register products that we import we have created 
procedures and take the time to meet the administrations to explain to them what our products are 
for” (Human Resources Director). However, the company does not engage in any type of inducement 
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to obtain authorizations or paperwork more rapidly: “This is a principle of the company, no matter 
where it is based in the world, there is no bakchich [petty corruption]. If we were solicited, we would 
prefer not to do any business than to enter into a system like this.” 
 The second regulative constraint that the company faces is the prevalence of counterfeit 
goods. The MNE subsidiary hires external agencies that carry out investigations on counterfeiting in 
the North African region and collaborates with the authorities in the fight against counterfeit goods. It 
organizes joint training with the government to train customs officers to identify fake products. “The 
authorities are very keen in collaborating with us for these trainings because we give them the tools to 
identify counterfeit consumer goods” (Human Resources Director).  
The Impact of the Arab Spring  
 
In Morocco, the Arab Spring had a small impact on the company’s business as sales declined 
slightly during the three months following the protests. As the company markets consumer goods, it 
is highly subject to consumption patterns and when consumption declines it is reflected in lower sales 
for the company. In Egypt, the impact on the company was greater, the subsidiary was closed as soon 
as unrest occurred on the streets, and staff was asked to work from home. However, in Morocco, the 
company monitored the events but did not close its office or factories. The company has a corporate 
security department within its headquarters in the United States that is responsible for monitoring 
events in the world and for informing the company subsidiaries of any safety measures that need to be 
taken.  
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
 When there are changes in government and different individuals come into office, the 
company’s external affairs office and General Director take the time to meet the new government 
representatives and explain to them the work that the company does. Through its long experience in 
Morocco, the company has established relationships with government actors and works to maintain 
them. The company lobbies the government to change regulations or improve standards: “we do not 
111 
 
engage in an unhealthy kind of lobbying, but rather we explain why certain regulations need to evolve 
or we notify the authorities if a norm or standard is missing to regulate a type of product” (Human 






Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Automotive  
Company size: 121,807 employees 
International presence: Group present in 128 countries 
2013 revenue: $46.1 billion US 
Head quarter location: Boulogne-Billancourt, Hauts-de-
Seine, France 
Founded in: 1899 
 
 
Company size: 8500 employees 
Organizational age: 1966 





MNE 7 is a French vehicle manufacturer with a history that dates back to 1899. Today, it is 
the third largest European automaker. The company has been operating in Morocco since 1928 
through the presence of a commercial concession that imports and sells the company’s cars in the 
country. In 1966, the company signed a convention with the Société Marocaine de Construction 
Automobile (SOMACA), Moroccan Society of Car Manufacturing, to assemble some its car models 
in the Moroccan factory. In 2005, the MNE acquired SOMACA to launch a new economy car and the 
company became its subsidiary. More than 90,000 vehicles annually are produced at the SOMACA, a 
part of which is exported to Europe (mostly France and Spain) and Egypt and Tunisia. Because the 
economy car was so successful in Europe, the company decided to open another factory in Morocco. 
In February 2012, the MNE opened an automobile manufacturing plant in Tanger, which 
manufactures several of the company’s models, including economy cars. Some of the vehicles are 
sold in Morocco but approximately 85% are exported. The manufacturing plant is a joint venture 
between the MNE who owns 53% of shares and the Caisse de dépot et de gestion (CDG), Deposit 
and Management Fund, a state-owned financial institution which owns 47% of the shares. Apart from 
the SOMACA, there was no automobile manufacturing in Morocco prior to the construction of the 
new plant. In fact, the MNE’s investment in Tanger has placed Morocco on the world map of the 
automobile industry. The company employs approximately 8,500 individuals in Morocco.  
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Institutional Environment  
Similarly to local and international firms, MNE 7 experiences some constraints such 
administrative slowness, specifically for the import and export of vehicles and other equipment. To 
facilitate procedures, the MNE created a dedicated in-house service in its subsidiary that works 
directly with Moroccan customs for import and export. The company also has a logistics service that 
manages the shipping of cars from ports. In addition, to facilitate processes and transactions, the 
company tries to establish long-term relationships with both government and non-government actors. 
It is often in contact with local administrations and authorities such as the Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Economy and the Supervising Ministry for matters that have an impact on the company. 
Given its long experience in Morocco and that it knows the institutional context very well, including 
government actors, the company is able to lobby the government to promote its interests. In fact, it 
has extensive market knowledge and has developed relationships with government actors.  
On the non-government side, the MNE interacts with associations for automobile importers 
such as Association des Importateurs de Véhicules Automobiles Montés (AIVAM), Association of 
Importers of Motor Vehicles. These associations play a role both as a channel to interact with political 
actors and as an important source of information about the market and the industry. For example, 
AIVAM collects information on sales and exports for the different car brands. AIVAM’s members 
also work with different ministries to militate for and defend the interests of car companies. Many 
topics are presented to the ministry such as road security and counterfeiting laws. The MNE 
subsidiary works with and leverages these professional associations and has its own dedicated 
services such as the public affairs division that communicate directly with different ministries to 
promote the interests of the company.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring   
 
The political unrest in Morocco and in the other countries in the Middle East had an impact on 
the company’s sales. During the revolution, the company stopped exporting the cars it produced to 
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Egypt and Tunisia because of the political instability in those countries. In fact, Morocco’s position as 
a car-exporting manufacturer was weakened during this period because the demand for cars in the 
Middle East declined.    
Opportunities for Institutional Work 
Following the protests in February and March 2011, the King of Morocco announced that a 
new constitution would be introduced and Morocco became one of the most stable regions in the 
country. Drawn by Morocco’s stability, the extensive infrastructure of the Mediterranean port and 
fiscal advantages made available by the state, the company signed a convention with the CDG, a state 
owned institution, to open a large-scale automotive factory in the city of Tanger.  
With the opening of the plant, the MNE has contributed to building an automobile 
manufacturing culture in Morocco. As no formal educational programs on automotive manufacturing 
or engineering existed in Morocco, the MNE created a training institute specifically for operators that 
were hired; each new operator received between 3 to 6 months of training. When the institute had just 
opened in 2012, expatriates conducted the training until the knowledge was transferred to locals. 
Since the institute’s creation, more than 100 million hours of training were provided to new recruits. 
This is an example of educating local actors with skills to support a new institution, the factory.   
As the MNE increased its physical presence in Morocco, it also developed more CSR 
programs. The company developed projects to promote road security, an important initiative to help 
prevent accidents. In partnership with the Ministry of Ministry of Transport and Equipment and 
NGOs, the company launched a program to promote road safety and targeted different groups 
including students, youth, the subsidiaries’ employees, and professional drivers. The company has 
also launched support programs for their employees and educational programs for children in the 
region where its plant is located: “We have implemented CSR projects that aim to provide support to 
the people in the areas where [the MNE] is implanted that relate to different themes, including 
education and road safety. In short, we strive to give meaning to our industrial activities; and this will 
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help strengthen our territorial anchoring as well as our image of being a responsible economic actor” 








Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Pharmaceuticals 
Company size:  employees 
International presence: Presence in more than 100 
countries 
2014 revenue: $38 billion US 
Headquarter location: Paris, France 
Founded in: 1973 
 
 
Company size:  900 employees 
Organizational age: 1965 
Ownership: Wholly-owned subsidiary  
 
 
Company Background  
MNE 8 is a multinational pharmaceutical company headquartered in Paris, France. The 
company produces and sells medicine in several therapeutic areas, including diabetes, oncology and 
cardiovascular disease and has operations in more than a 100 countries. In Morocco, the company 
operates two subsidiaries – one that it owns at 100% and another that it owns at 85%. The company 
has 900 employees, which represent about 17% of the pharmaceutical sector in Morocco.  
Institutional Environment   
In 1965, the Moroccan government introduced a regulation that companies selling medication 
in Morocco must also have an industrial presence in the country. The MNE subsidiary manufactures 
medication and other products for companies that do not have an industrial presence in Morocco 
through its second subsidiary, the one that it owns at 85%.  
The pharmaceutical industry in Morocco is highly regulated and the company conforms to the 
rules and regulations set by the government. For example, to introduce a new type of medication, the 
company must submit a scientific file to the health authorities, and then obtain an approval as well as 
a selling price to market the medication. The procedure of registering the medication can be lengthy 
and the subsidiary has been lobbying the Ministry of Health to review drug policy in Morocco that 
would accelerate administrative procedures, including for the registration of new medication.  
The company also leverages associations such as Maroc Innovation & Santé (MIS), Morocco 
Innovation & Health, to relay messages to the authorities such as proposals or counterproposals. MIS 
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provides information on the pharmaceutical industry and brings together different stakeholders 
including industry, government, health professionals, and civil society. MIS has held meetings with 
the government to discuss medical coverage for drugs, which remain insufficient in Morocco. The 
subsidiary, in partnership with MIS, has been lobbying the government to increase medical coverage 
for patients as medical coverage helps spur innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring events had an indirect impact on the company’s activities. The subsidiary 
gained a greater awareness about social issues and the importance of taking into consideration 
employees’ needs and launching relevant corporate social responsibility initiatives. According to the 
company’s Communications Director: “Today companies are realizing that they have to promote and 
increase CSR; companies must generate profit but they must also be involved in CSR.”  
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
The MNE has introduced new regulations in the subsidiary to increase accountability and 
transparency. These regulations determine the types and amounts of gifts that can be offered to 
doctors or other health professionals. These changes within the company are consistent with 
Morocco’s political will to curb corruption following the Arab Spring.  
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MNE 9  
 
Global MNE (newly-formed joint venture) Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Energy 
Company size: 2000 permanent, 1185 retail  
International presence: presence in 16 countries  
2013 revenue: $192 million US 
Headquarter location: London 
Founded in: 2011 
 
 
Company size: 710 employees 
Organizational age: 2011 
Ownership: Joint Venture 
 
 
Company Background  
 
MNE 9 is a joint venture created in December 2011 by three companies – 2 multinational 
energy companies and a private investment firm. One of the MNE subsidiaries had been operating in 
Morocco since 1928 and sold 80 % percent of its shares to the other two companies to create the joint 
venture. The merger created a pan-African company with subsidiaries in 16 African countries and 
1400 service stations throughout Africa, including 330 in Morocco. The company’s main products 
and services include commercial fuels for the aviation, marine and mining sectors, liquefied 
petroleum gas, lubricants and pumping stations. The company employs 710 people in its Moroccan 
subsidiary.  
Institutional Environment  
In Morocco, there are limited national energy resources available and the country is strongly 
dependent on foreign supplies of oil, natural gas and coal. Fossil fuels are imported and are then 
provided at below-market rates to local consumers.  
The structure of the energy sector is one of the biggest constraints for the subsidiary in the 
Moroccan market. Distribution companies such as the subsidiary either import or buy fuel products in 
Morocco and then sell them to consumers at a price that is fixed and imposed by the government. The 
price at which the companies buy the fuel products is higher than that at which they sell them; the 
companies are then reimbursed for the difference by the state’s compensation fund. However, the 
reimbursement process can be lengthy and companies have to manage these financial costs for long 
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periods of time until the compensation fund reimburses them. To respond to this issue, the subsidiary 
has been working within the Groupement des Petroliers Marocain, Grouping of Moroccan Oil 
Companies, a professional association that regroups companies in the distribution of fuel and gas in 
Morocco. Through this association, the subsidiary and other distribution companies have been 
pressuring the government to reimburse them in more reasonable time frames.  
Impact of the Arab Spring  
The company was only moderately impacted by the government instability in Morocco; the 
company experienced greater delays in being reimbursed by the compensation fund.  
In 2012, the government adopted a national energy strategy with the goal of diversifying the 
energy mix and of minimizing the energy sector’s impact on public finances by developing programs 
to stimulate local production in alternative energy sources and reduce fuel subsidies. However, 
according to the Communications Director of the MNE 9 subsidiary “there was a change in 
government and some reforms were introduced but we were only moderately affected by these 
reforms.”  
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
Although the company was only moderately impacted by the institutional change, it continues 
to participate in meetings with different associations, including the Groupement des Petroliers 
Marocain, the FENELEC and CGEM to ensure that its interests are protected. It also maintains its 
relationships with key government actors including the Ministry of Energy, with whom it holds 





Global MNE Moroccan office  
 
Industry: Environmental Services 
Company size:  330,000 employees 
International presence: Offices in 48 countries 
2013 revenue: $ 26.2 billion US 
Headquarter location: Paris, France 
Founded in: 1853 
 
 
Company size: 4000 employees 
Organizational age: 2002 
Ownership: Wholly-owned subsidiaries  
 
 
Company Background  
 
MNE 10 is a French multinational firm in the environmental services industry with a history 
dating back to 1853 and has operations in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. The company has 
been present in Morocco since 2002 and provides outsourced management services in the fields of 
water supply, electricity and liquid waste management. The management of these contracts is a form 
of public service concession where the MNE has entered into an agreement with the government to 
fulfill the management of public utility contracts. MNE 10 employs about 4000 people and operates 
through its subsidiaries in the cities of Tanger, Tetouan and Rabat-Sale. The MNE has contributed to 
improving water, electricity and liquid waste management services in Morocco; for example, the 
coverage of drinking water and sanitation systems rose from 15% to 30% in some cities where it 
operates. In addition, more than 70,000 social connections were made to increase access to drinking 
water. In 2006, the company worked in partnership with the government and connected 
approximately 60,000 households in marginalized neighborhoods in Tanger to water and sewage 
networks.   
Institutional Environment  
 
 The company faces regulative constraints in its institutional environment as a result of 
excessive bureaucracy and slow administrative procedures, which have an impact on the company’s 
business operations. According to respondent: “I have a pile of papers to sign every day. And the 
government doesn’t recognize emails or any electronic forms” (Communications Director). In 
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addition, because the company is providing a public utility service it is accountable to several 
government actors, which increases the number of administrative procedures that it must undertake to 
operate. The company is accountable to the Court of Auditors, a government organization that has the 
mandate of reviewing all the expenditures of public companies that render a public service and to 
make sure that the rules of project tenders are done properly and that all fiscal rules are respected. 
The MNE must also work with the Ministry of Interior, which oversees all concessionary services, 
the Delegating Authority, which is made of locally elected officials in municipalities that grant public 
utility contracts to the company, and the Permanent Support service which oversees the day-to-day 
activities of the company. When the company wants to invest in a project such as a pumping station, 
it must obtain an approval from the Delegating Authority through the Permanent Support Service, 
which ensures that the amount invested and the site chosen for the project is appropriate.    
Despite the company’s contribution to improving environmental services in Morocco since it 
arrived in 2002 by providing better services to citizens in sanitation and water supply and by 
optimizing resources, the company has had a negative image in Morocco. Citizens view the 
company’s prices as too high and are critical of the company’s procurement of contracts, arguing that 
the company was being granted concessions rather than participating in tenders to obtain projects, 
which reduced transparency and credibility. In 2006, consumers protested against the high prices of 
water and electricity and called for the company to leave Morocco. To attenuate the demands of the 
protestors, the local authorities asked the MNE to revise the clauses of the contracts it fulfilled, 
including the services rendered and its pricing procedures. Therefore, it was within this tense and 
volatile environment that the company was operating in when the Arab Spring erupted in many 
countries in the Middle East, including Morocco.   
The Impact of the Arab Spring 
 
In February 2011, protesters in Tanger, in the North of Morocco gathered and protested 
against the company, which again was accused of charging exorbitantly high prices for public 
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utilities. The protesters campaigned to boycott invoice payments in the different cities where the 
subsidiary operates. In order to bill water and electricity usage, the company’s employees have to 
physically verify electricity and water meters at different households; these employees were also 
targeted by the protestors. Company property was damaged as vehicles were set on fire. For the three 
months following the Arab Spring, the company was unable to receive payments from its customers, 
particularly those in poor and working class neighborhoods and its cash flow was severely impacted. 
During the protests, the company was also targeted by the local branches of international NGOs that 
militate for the protection of the environment and water sources.  
The Arab Spring events had an impact on the company’s relationship with the authorities. The 
municipal government of the city of Tanger accused the company of having failed to invest in 
improving services as had been outlined in its contract and presented the company with a penalty of 
55.3 million Dirham (6.27 million USD) for delays in the execution of investments in the context of 
their delegated management contract from 2002 to 2008. In addition, there were fewer interactions 
between municipal officials and the company. According to the respondent:” they saw us [the 
company] as toxic, when they did talk to us, it was to tell us to get our acts together. They were afraid 
of how the population would react” (Communications Director). Government actors were striving to 
retain their legitimacy within the tense political environment and did not want to be associated with 
the company, which citizens were protesting against and demanding to leave Morocco.  
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
The company engaged in several forms of institutional work to rebuild its legitimacy in 
Morocco. It changed its communications strategy to reach the individuals that were protesting against 
its presence and to improve its image in Morocco, it worked to improve its relationship with 
government and social actors and implemented measures to become more integrated and local in the 
institutional environment.  




Following the Arab Spring events, the company made several changes to address its negative 
image in Morocco. The company replaced its Chief Executive Officer, and hired new marketing and 
communications teams to revamp the company image. A new communications director who had prior 
experience in crisis management was hired to devise a communications strategy that would address 
the negative publicity that the company had received in the months following the Arab Spring. The 
communications team built their strategy to respond to the needs of Moroccan citizens. For example, 
they created advertising materials that were more culturally sensitive to the conservative segments of 
the population than the materials that had been published in the past. The company also stopped 
advertising on new services such as new payment methods (i.e. through automatic teller machines or 
using a phone to pay bills). The respondent noted: “We were accused of being greedy, of stealing 
money and not investing in the country. If we kept advertising on how to pay for invoices, then what 
we were saying is – all we care about is making money.” The MNE used its advertising budget to 
launch a corporate social responsibility (CSR) program that was aimed at providing support to 
marginalized individuals in Morocco. Most of the CSR campaign targeted individuals in the north of 
the country where the company was most violently targeted. One of the major projects that the 
company launched focused on improving the lives of working mothers from marginalized 
neighborhoods; the company worked with local NGOs to come up with initiatives that addressed the 
needs of these women. As a result of the CSR campaign, the company initiated several programs, 
including literacy training, embroidery skills development, and day cares to assist working mothers. 
The company also launched an educational bursary program for children from marginalized 
neighborhoods.  
Strategies to Rebuild Relationships with Social and Government Actors 
Following the launch of CSR projects in the cities where it operates, the company starting 
organizing events and inviting locally elected officials (municipal councils) and other local 
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government actors and involving them in some of its CSR projects. For example, the company 
worked in partnership with the authorities for the launch of an educational bursary program for 
children. The company’s image improved as it increased its engagement in Morocco through the CSR 
programs: “We rebuilt relationships with everyone in our environment through CSR initiatives. Our 
CSR was based on micro projects, at the local level, with a grassroots approach” (Communications 
director). The company became more greatly aware of the need to consider its stakeholders following 
the Arab Spring events and started engaging in lobbying to explain the value of projects to its 
different stakeholders. For example, before building a new pipeline in a street, the communications 
team started notifying NGOs in the area to assist the company in raising awareness about the 
importance of the project. Other teams in the company lobbied at the level of the authorities to inform 
them of projects. According to the respondent “In the past, the company hardly did any lobbying. 
After the Arab Spring, the lobbying has been ongoing and at every level – from the top to the 
bottom.”  
The company also a hired a Director of Branding and Reputation, which was a new role 
within its organization, to manage the negative image of the company and to help repair relationships 
with social actors such as NGOs and local authorities. The Director of Branding and Reputation 
monitors the activities of NGOs that organize protests against the company. He also participates in 
promoting the company’s projects to youth, women, and neighborhood associations to dissuade them 
from participating in further protests organized by NGOs. 
As a company that provides public utility services, the subsidiary is accountable to several 
government divisions and has worked to improve its relationship with different government actors 
following the protests. Prior to the Arab Spring, the company engaged primarily in discussion for 
projects and investment opportunities with the Ministry of Interior and did not engage much in 
dialogue with municipal elected officials in the cities where it operates. In fact, during the Arab 
Spring, elected officials were very critical of the company and accused the company of not investing 
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enough in water and electricity services infrastructure. Following the Arab Spring, the company has 
organized more discussions with locally elected officials and the exchanges are more partnership 
based.   
Strategies to Become More Integrated in Local Institutional Context  
 
In order to regain legitimacy in the institutional environment, the subsidiary implemented 
several strategies to be perceived as a local company. For example, the company ensured that all of 
its advertisements were culturally sensitive and would not offend the more conservative segments of 
society. Another strategy was to make sure that the events or other initiatives it organized had a local 
character; during events in which the company invited locally elected officials or other government or 
social actors, the company set up a Moroccan flag and played the national anthem.   
The CSR program launched by the company was also a strategy to help anchor its presence in 
Morocco. The company’s new CSR campaign specifically targeted working mothers because in 
Moroccan society mothers have an influence on their families. The company wanted to improve its 
reputation amongst these women who may begin to view the company in a more positive light, which 
would help the company to start working in marginalized neighborhoods again. The respondent 
explained that: “My goal was very clear: to bridge back the gap between the company and the people, 
authorities, elected officials, civil society and to go back to those areas where the employees no 
longer felt safe. I wanted to make sure that my colleagues in uniform regained their pride in working 
for the company”  (Communications Director).  
Prior to the Arab Spring, the company’s main CSR projects were sustainable development 
initiatives in the South of Morocco launched through the CSR foundation of the headquarters in 
France. According to the respondent: “what [parent company] was telling us to do was leading us to 
hit the wall” (Communications Director). Following the Arab Spring, the company implemented CSR 
programs in the cities and neighborhoods where they had most of their operations to become local 
and more in sync with the environment.  
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In terms of local CSR, the company has also been hiring both international and local 
contractors for large-scale projects such as the construction of water treatment facilities. “Since the 
Arab Spring, the company is now more sensitive to the fact that when it has tenders that Moroccan 
companies respond to the tenders” (Communications Director). The company started a project of 
social progress that ensures that the contractors hired for the projects have ISO standards, declare 
their employees to social security, treat them fairly and train them. The MNE sends inspectors to 













Global MNE Tunisian office  
 
Industry: Computer software and hardware 
Company size: 128,000 employees 
International presence: Offices in 100 countries 
2014 revenue: $86.83 billion 
Headquarter location: Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Founded in: 1975 
 
 
Company size: 40 employees 
Organizational age: 1993 
Ownership: Wholly-owned subsidiary  
 
 
Company Background  
 
MNE 11 is the subsidiary of an American multinational that develops, manufactures, licenses 
and sells computer software, consumer electronics and personal computers and services, with a 
history dating back to 1975 and with operations in more than 140 countries. MNE 11 has been active 
in North Africa since 1993 when it opened a sales office in Tunisia. It offers sales services and local 
consulting support in Arabic and French. 
Institutional Context  
The subsidiary of MNE 11 has worked extensively with the Tunisian government to identify 
how software and related technologies and services can bring governments and industry closer to 
their objectives. In 2006, the company signed an agreement with the government of Tunisia to 
support its electronic government initiatives and the development of the local information technology 
(I.T) industry. The subsidiary helped the government upgrade and modernize its computer and 
networking capabilities and invested in programs, knowledge transfer, support for I.T skills growth 
and educational efforts. As part of the company’s strategic agreement with the government, the 
company opened an innovation center in 2006, the first of its kind in North Africa, to support the 
development of the Tunisian software industry by stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship and 
boosting industrial partnership. 
 Despite the opportunities that the subsidiary has in Tunisia, it also faces some important 
constraints including the lack of software upgrades by both public and private sector enterprises and 
128 
 
the lack of anti-piracy enforcement, which means that many of the company’s products are pirated 
and sold for a lot less in the informal market which decreases sales for the company. The company 
has been lobbying the government to introduce more effective sanctions against the sale and use of 
pirated products.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring 
 As a result of the government instability following the revolution, several contracts between 
the company and the government were cancelled or delayed for services that the company provides to 
the government; the company’s sales declined during this period. In addition, the company 
experienced difficulties in holding discussions with the interim governments that came to power 
following the revolution.  
During the period of the Arab Spring there was a strong anti-American sentiment in Tunisia 
and other regions in the Middle East, which was of concern to American multinational corporations, 
including the subsidiary of MNE 11. The population protested against Western influences in Tunisia 
and questioned the impact of western companies in the country. The situation was aggravated for the 
MNE when a WikiLeaks document showing some of the terms of the 2006 strategic agreement 
between the subsidiary and the Tunisian government, where the subsidiary provided the government 
with new software. According to the document, the subsidiary agreed to train Tunisian law 
enforcement officers on cyber criminality in exchange for the government buying the company’s 
software. Increasing government officials’ capabilities through I.T training can be positive but given 
the authorities’ interference in citizen’s use of the Internet, questions were asked on whether this 
increased the government’s ability to monitor the actions of their citizens. In fact, prior to the 
revolution that toppled the government, Tunisia’s former President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, firmly 
controlled elections and the government imprisoned political opponents including bloggers and 
journalists. As a result of the WikiLeaks document that surfaced, the population accused the MNE of 
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supporting an oppressive regime. The company responded to the divulged information by stating that 
it works in partnership with governments all over the world for business opportunities:  
" [The MNE] partners with countries around the world to help spur local IT innovation and 
job creation, help broaden access to IT, and to enable governments to adopt IT in the delivery of 
services to citizens. This has been the focus of our work in Tunisia. Any training was provided as part 
of the standard global programs — including the Security Cooperation Program — that we have in 
place." (ZDNet.com)   
 
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
In addition to communicating on the ways that it had contributed to improving the IT 
infrastructure in Tunisia, the company also responded to legitimacy pressures by developing a new 
CSR strategy to respond to the needs and priorities of Tunisians. The company assessed the country’s 
major challenges and priorities and invested in programs on employment, entrepreneurship and IT 
skills development. MNE collaborated with local NGOs, associations, government agencies, and the 
private sector to work on these programs. The company communicated on these initiatives and used 
public relations tactics to dismiss rumors of unethical collaboration with the previous regime and to 
improve its public image: “Corporate Social Responsibility is a strong tool in moments of crisis – it 
shows that the company cares about its people in the current context as well as about its business 





Global MNE Egyptian office  
 
Industry: Computer software and hardware 
Company size: 128,000 employees 
International presence: Offices in 100 countries 
2013 revenue: $86.83 billion 
Headquarter location: Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Founded in: 1975 
 
 
Company size: 160 employees 
Organizational age: 1995 
Ownership: Limited Liability Company   
 
 
Company Background   
 
MNE 12 is the Egyptian subsidiary of an American multinational that develops, manufactures, 
licenses and sells computer software, consumer electronics and personal computers and services. The 
company was founded in 1975 and today operates in more than 140 countries. MNE 12 was 
established in 1995 as a representative office. In 1997, it became a limited liability company to 
enhance its presence in the Egyptian market. The MNE offers a wide range of localized and 
customized products and services to the Egyptian market.  
Institutional Environment  
The subsidiary of MNE 12 has had a positive impact on Egypt’s economic development, 
including in supporting Egypt to develop an information technology infrastructure.  In 2006, the 
company opened an innovation center in Cairo for applied research. The company has worked with 
the Ministry of Education to promote the use of information technology in education; it has 
contributed to training more than 80,000 teachers to help educators merge technology with the 
educational process.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring 
Since its establishment in Egypt in the late 1990s, the subsidiary has been working in 
collaboration with the government on various projects and has supported its economic and social 
initiatives. Therefore, when the government was overthrown in February 2011, following the Arab 
Spring protests, the instability that ensued had an important impact on the subsidiary. The 
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government actors with whom the company had collaborated were replaced and the company had to 
manage these important changes: “The situation was complicated – in the three years that followed 
the revolution, there were five different prime ministers and five different cabinets. Every time a new 
government was in place, we had to reintroduce the company and what we were trying to accomplish 
in Egypt” (Country Manager). The company had developed a collaborative relationship with the 
authorities; following the Arab Spring it had to reintroduce its goals and objectives and the value it 
was contributing to the country.  The company experienced a significant loss of revenue because the 
government was one of its clients and following the Arab Spring government priorities changed, 
including less of a focus on technology.  
Similarly to the subsidiary of the MNE in Tunisia, the Egyptian subsidiary was also 
confronted with anti-American sentiment and pressures during the period of the Arab Spring. The 
population protested against Western influences in Egypt and questioned the value and impact of 
western companies with business operations in the country. The company responded to these 
normative pressures by presenting and explaining some of the initiatives it had launched since its 
establishment in Egypt and the ways in which it has contributed to economic development, including 
the launch of training programs for students in information technology, and supporting the country in 
building an information technology infrastructure.   
Opportunities for Institutional Work  
 
The subsidiary used various strategies to cope with the institutional changes occurring in 
Egypt following the revolution and to maintain its legitimacy within the institutional environment. It 
attempted to rebuild it relationship with government actors by reintroducing its business and its value 
preposition. In addition, the subsidiary leveraged different stakeholders to demonstrate to the new 
government the important role that it had in Egypt. To demonstrate its value to the Ministry of 
Education, it provided teaching and information technology tools to teachers, one of the stakeholders 
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of the Ministry of Education. According to the respondent “we worked with different stakeholders to 
present ourselves to the government.” 
Furthermore, to support the transition that Egypt was experiencing, the company decided to 
invest in skills development, employability, and entrepreneurship initiatives for Egyptians. The 
company contributed $5 million in kind and in cash for CSR programs including training youth in 
information technology skills and contributing to an employment website that supports young 
Egyptians in their job search. The company also provided support to women to encourage them to 
join the workforce either by finding employment or launching their own businesses. The Arab Spring 
made the company more greatly aware that Egyptians were not only centralized in the big cities – 
Cairo, Alexandria, and Giza – and the company expanded some of its CSR programs to other 
Egyptian governorates.  It organized events and training on employability, entrepreneurship, and 
business startups for youth in these regions. As a result of the turbulent events, the company is more 
implicated in the institutional context and is striving to contribute to solutions to improve the situation 
for young people and has a greater role in contributing to the country: “we try to leverage NGOs to 

















I. Information about the respondent 
 
1.     What is your position in the company? 
 
2.      How long have you been working at the company?  
 
3.      How much experience do you have working in Morocco or in 
another emerging market?  
 
II. General company information 
 
4. Is the multinational enterprise a wholly owned subsidiary? To what 
extent are decision-making procedures influenced by the parent company? 
 
5. How long has the company been operating in Morocco?  
 
6. What are the main projects of the subsidiary in Morocco? 
 
7. How many employees does the company have in Morocco? 
 
8. What is the proportion of local stuff versus expatriate staff? 
 
III. International experience of the multinational enterprise 
 
9. What are main obstacles, barriers or challenges to doing business in 
Morocco? (example: regulative, normative, cognitive demands) 
   
10. How does the company manage the challenges that it encounters?  
 
IV.  Relationships 
 
11. What are the subsidiary’s most important relationships (ex. 
customers, suppliers, politicians, NGOs, other subunits, parent company)? 
a. How does the company manage these relationships?  
 
12. How does the company manage relationships with 
political/government units? Do they present opportunities/challenges? 
 
13. Does the company belong to an industry, trade or business 
association?  
a. Do these relationships allow the company to overcome some 




V.  Critical events 
 
In 2011, the Arab region experienced political and economic instability due to 
the ‘Arab Spring’ events.  
 
14. Did the Arab Spring have an impact on the company’s business 
operations in Morocco? (Examples: cancelled contracts, delays, regulatory 
changes) 
 
15. Did these events have an impact on how the company managed its 
relationships with key actors? If so, how? 
 
VI.  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a legitimacy tool 
 
16. I saw on your website that you have established (x) program to 
assist in the development of the country. What other kinds of social activities does 
the company have in Morocco? Please provide examples of these programs. 
 
17. Did the company undertake more social activities after the Arab 
Spring events? 
 
VII.  Looking forward 
 
18. How does the company view its future operations in Morocco? Are 
there any major concerns in terms of the social/governmental environment for 
doing business in Morocco?  
 
 
 
 
